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Leveraging Pharma to Lower Premiums:
Medical Loss Ratio Regulation
in the Pharmaceutical Industry
Many recognize escalating drug prices as a significant dilemma
related to America’s rising healthcare costs. Yet few can agree on what to
do about them. Unaffordable drug prices are a result of many complex
forces. One theory to address this problem is to reduce all government
intervention and let normal market forces act as they usually do to bring
the goods’ prices down to consumer-friendly ranges. However, the prescription drug market is not, and perhaps never can be, a normal market.
Reasons for this include (1) a lack of price transparency, (2) information
and control asymmetries between patients and physicians, (3) third-party
payors, (4) demand that remains constant irrespective of any exorbitant
price increases (i.e., market inelasticity), and (5) patent-ensured monopolies. These factors disrupt the normal market forces that usually
maintain prices at levels amenable to the general public (i.e., price equilibrium). Left unchecked, Big Pharma increase their prices partly to pay
for elevated marketing and other expenses and partly to recoup greater
earnings. Consequently, they rake in substantial profits—at an average
greater than any other industry. Thus, rising drug prices burden not only
those who need them but also those who are expected to help pay for them.
To right this abnormal market, this Note suggests an alternative
theory: that Congress should apply a medical loss ratio framework to the
pharmaceutical drug industry, similar to the ratio framework applied to
reform the health insurance industry. This framework seeks to balance
corporate profits with consumer benefits by separating profits and “other”
less value-adding expenses from those that add greater value to the
consumer (i.e., “medical loss”). In the health insurance industry’s 80:20
ratio framework, if the less value-adding expenses (e.g., profits, sales and
marketing) cross the ratio threshold (20%), then the companies must
reimburse the excess back to the consumer. This measure has eased some
insurance premium increases. Similar reform is needed in the pharmaceutical industry, as currently the industry averages 21% profit—
significantly above that of other industries—while also spending around
23% on sales and marketing and around 30% on manufacturing.
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Therefore, the average medical loss ratio is roughly 30:70 (30% on medical
loss and 70% on less value-adding areas). Imposing a stricter ratio
threshold, such as 40:60, would provide some much-needed incentives for
drug companies to reduce their lesser-value-adding expenses and, as a
result, reduce drug prices. If Big Pharma failed to meet the 40% threshold,
then the excess would be returned to the consumer. Imposing a medical
loss ratio regulation in the pharmaceutical industry is a promising solution to one of our nation’s greatest healthcare cost concerns.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Healthcare spending in America is growing at an alarming rate.
In 2015 healthcare spending totaled $3.2 trillion, or $9990 per
person.1 This spending is projected to grow at an average of 5.8%
between 2015 and 2025—approximately 1.3% faster than the GDP.2
With healthcare costs rising every year, controlling this growth has

1. National Health Expenditures 2016 Highlights, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS.,
https://www.cms.gov/research-statistics-data-and-systems/statistics-trends-and-reports
/NationalHealthExpendData/Downloads/highlights.pdf (last visited Nov. 7, 2017).
2. Sean P. Keehan et al., National Expenditure Projections, 2015–2025: Economy, Prices,
and Aging Expected to Shape Spending and Enrollment, 35 HEALTH AFF. 1522, 1522–31 (2016).
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become a national priority.3 One area with noticeably rising costs is
the pharmaceutical industry. Americans spent $323 billion (roughly 10% of total healthcare expenditures) on prescription medications in 2016—and that is after rebates and discounts.4 For those
under age sixty-five, drug prices are expected to jump 11.6% in
2017.5 As a comparison, wages are expected to rise only 2.5% in
2017.6 Perhaps unsurprisingly, when comparing industries’ net
profits and percent growth, biotech companies consistently rank
higher than almost any other industry.7 It is these sky-high corporate profits that account for a remarkable portion of rising
medication prices.8 While some individuals have recently proposed
ways to rein in drug prices—such as foreign importation—more
overarching reform is needed.9 To counter the pharmaceutical industry’s abnormal market forces and to control unsustainable costs,
Congress should enact a pharmaceutical Medical Loss Ratio (MLR)

3. Zeke Emanuel et al., State Options to Control Health Care Costs and Improve Quality,
HEALTH AFF. (Apr. 28, 2016), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2016/04/28/state-options-to
-control-health-care-costs-and-improve-quality/; Steven M. Lieberman & Paul B. Ginsburg,
Would Price Transparency for Generic Drugs Lower Costs for Payers and Patients?, BROOKINGS
INST. (2017), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/es_20170613_ge
nericdrugpricing.pdf (outlining that every one percent in an average generic prescription
reimbursement would cut $1 billion from the nation’s healthcare spending).
4. U.S. Prescription Drug Spending as High as $610 Billion by 2021: Report, CNBC:
HEALTH CARE (May 4, 2017, 6:12 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/05/04/us-prescription
-drug-spending-as-high-as-610-billion-by-2021-report.html (“U.S. spending on prescription
medicines in 2016 increased by 5.8 percent over 2015 levels to $450 billion based on list prices,
and by 4.8 percent to $323 billion when adjusted for discounts and rebates.”).
5. For older Americans, price hikes will be a little lower at 9.9%. Aimee Picchi,
Prognosis for Rx in 2017: More Painful Drug-Price Hikes, CBS NEWS: MONEYWATCH (Dec. 30,
2016, 12:32 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/drug-prices-to-rise-12-percent-in-2017/.
6. Id.
7. Keith Speights, 12 Big Pharma Stats That Will Blow You Away, MOTLEY FOOL (July
31, 2016, 2:04 PM), https://www.fool.com/investing/2016/07/31/12-big-pharma-stats
-that-will-blow-you-away.aspx; see also Sean Williams, 7 Facts You Probably Don’t Know About
Big Pharma, MOTLEY FOOL (July 19, 2015, 9:06 AM), https://www.fool.com/investing
/value/2015/07/19/7-facts-you-probably-dont-know-about-big-pharma.aspx (explaining
the finances of pharmaceutical companies).
8. Melody Petersen, How 4 Drug Companies Rapidly Raised Prices on Life-Saving Drugs,
L.A. TIMES (Dec. 21, 2016, 3:35 PM), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-senate-drug
-price-study-20161221-story.html (“The companies raised prices—not to fund research to
discover new drugs—but to boost profits for executives and investors.”).
9. Rachel Bluth, Should the U.S. Make It Easier to Import Prescription Drugs?, PBS (Mar.
22, 2017, 10:33 AM), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/health/u-s-make-easier-import-pre
scription-drugs.
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regulation, similar to that imposed by the Affordable Care Act
(ACA) for health insurance companies.
A. MLR Regulation Corrects Market Failure in the Insurance Industry
Imposing an MLR regulation would assist in managing the
market failures in the pharmaceutical industry, as it has for the
health insurance industry. Market failure occurs when, for a variety
of reasons, a market fails to function like a normal free market by
not allocating resources efficiently or achieving price equilibrium.10
One type of market failure is inequality, in which transactions
concentrate rewards in the hands of a few.11 In the health insurance
industry, inequality is exemplified when the free market economy
fails to provide reasonable safeguards to prevent insurers from
raising premiums—well beyond what a consumer would willingly
spend—simply in order to concentrate wealth for the insurance
executives.12 Given the non-transparent and third-party payor
natures of health insurance, normal market forces are often
inadequate to achieve price equilibrium in this industry. The
ACA’s insurance MLR regulation attempts to normalize resource
allocation in this market by putting guidelines around how much
revenue may be kept as profit or used for other administrative expenses.13
In general, an MLR distinguishes the dollars spent on “other”
expenses, such as administrative expenses and profits, from
“medical loss.”14 “Medical loss” is defined as care-related and
improvement expenditures like treatment, providers’ salaries, and

10. Types of Market Failure, ECON. O NLINE, http://www.economicsonline.co.uk
/Market_failures/Types_of_market_failure.html (last visited Dec. 27, 2017).
11. Id.
12. See Wendell Potter, Why Big Insurance Adores the American Health Care Act, MOYERS
& CO. (Mar. 23, 2017), http://billmoyers.com/story/why-big-insurance-adores-the-am
erican-health-care-act/; see also Fighting Unreasonable Health Insurance Premium Increases, CTR.
FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERV., https://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Fact-Sheets
-and-FAQs/ratereview05192011a.html (last updated Nov. 16, 2011) (laying out the unexplained rapidly rising health insurance premiums and other health insurance trends preACA that supported the need for the insurance MLR regulation).
13. See generally 45 C.F.R. § 158 (2017).
14. Medical Loss Ratio, HEALTHCARE.GOV, https://www.healthcare.gov/glossary/med
ical-loss-ratio-MLR/ (last visited Feb. 22, 2017).
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research and development (R&D) costs.15 “Other” expenses include
those providing relatively less value directly to the consumer, such
as overhead, marketing, C-suite salaries, and profits.16 The ACA’s
MLR regulation requires health insurance companies that keep
more than 15% of their income from large employer plans for these
“other” expenses (or 20% from small employer and individual
plans) to rebate the excess back to the consumer.17 The regulation
establishes an 85:15 or 80:20 ratio: Insurers must spend 85% or 80%
of their revenues directly on “medical loss.” In doing so, the MLR
regulation ensures that health insurers provide a reasonable
amount of value to the consumer, in effect moderating their
premium hikes.18 Consequently, the MLR regulation incentivizes
insurers to invest in value-promoting care and improvements,
while refining efficiencies in less value-adding areas—particularly
by reducing administrative waste and outlandish profits. In an
industry where normal free market forces are inadequate, the
ACA’s MLR regulation has successfully pared down insurers’
“other” costs, including profits.19
B. MLR Regulation Returns Billions to Consumers
Since the enactment of the health insurance MLR regulation,
health insurance companies have returned billions of dollars that
were previously kept for profits and other administrative costs in

15. Medical Loss Ratio, supra note 14; Louise Norris, Billions in ACA Rebates Show 80/20
Rule’s Impact, HEALTHINSURANCE.ORG (Jan. 18, 2018), https://www.healthinsurance.org
/affordable-care-act/medical-loss-ratio-returns-nearly-2b-to-consumers/; Rate Review & the
80/20 Rule, HEALTHCARE.GOV, https://www.healthcare.gov/health-care-law-protections/rate
-review/ (last visited Feb. 22, 2017).
16. Medical Loss Ratio, supra note 14.
17. Id.; Norris, supra note 15; Rate Review & the 80/20 Rule, supra note 15. By law,
insurance companies cannot base the price of health premiums on health, medical history,
or gender. They can only account for five things when setting premium prices: age, location,
tobacco use, individual versus family enrollment, or plan category. How Insurance Companies
Set Health Premiums, HEALTHCARE.GOV, https://www.healthcare.gov/how-plans-set-your
-premiums/ (last visited Nov. 7, 2017).
18. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-14-580, PRIVATE HEALTH INSURANCE:
EARLY EFFECTS OF MEDICAL LOSS RATIO REQUIREMENTS AND REBATES ON INSURERS AND
ENROLLEES 1 (2014) [hereinafter PRIVATE HEALTH INSURANCE].
19. See Norris, supra note 15.
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the form of rebates for employers and consumers.20 For example,
seventy-five percent of the money returned was originally used to
pay brokers and agents, but since brokers’ and agents’ pay fell on
the “other” side of the MLR ratio, insurers had to rebate the excess
funds so as to meet the ratio threshold.21 Insurers are further adjusting payments to agents and brokers, some reporting the MLR
regulation thresholds as the primary motivator.22 Most remarkably,
insurers’ underwriting gain (i.e., profits) diminished markedly
from $8.8 to $3.7 billion, from 2012 to 2014.23 Specifically, insurers
returned $1.1 billion in rebates to consumers in 2012, $504 million
in 2013, down to $333 million in 2014, up to $469 million in 2015,
and $397 million in 2016.24 The ACA’s MLR regulation did its job.
Insurers are right-sizing their premiums and rebating billions of
dollars back to employers and individuals.25 While tightening their
belts and squeezing out less value-adding costs, these companies
still recoup healthy profits.
Importantly, the MLR ratio is not arbitrary or impractical. Before the ACA’s MLR regulation was enacted, most insurers (77% of
insurers in the large employer market and 70% in the small market)
20. Specifically, insurers returned $1.1 billion in rebates in 2012, $504 million for 2013,
down to $333 million in 2014, up to $469 million in 2015, and $397 million in 2016. Norris,
supra note 15.
21. PRIVATE HEALTH INSURANCE, supra note 18, at 18.
22. Furthermore, administrative costs for the 2014 individual market decreased despite an increase in premium revenue. This indicates insurers are expanding coverage to
more individuals while maintaining efficient administrative expenses. See id. at 21; see also
Mark A. Hall & Michael J. McCue, Realizing Health Reform’s Potential: How Has the Affordable
Care Act Affected Health Insurers’ Financial Performance?, COMMONWEALTH FUND (July 2016),
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/~/media/files/publications/issue-brief/2016/jul
/1886_hall_insurers_financial_performance_aca_rb_revised_07_26_2016.pdf.
23. Hall, supra note 22, at 4–5. To note, in 2017 insurers reported markedly increased
underwriting gain and net income all while remaining within the ratio requirements. This
merits further investigation, including into the effects of the recent repeal of the health
insurer tax. Perhaps the influx of subsidy money means the resulting ratio of “other” should
be smaller. See Bob Herman, Blue Cross Blue Shield Insurers Are Still Doing Well, AXIOS (Nov.
7, 2017), https://www.axios.com/the-blue-cross-blue-shield-insurers-are-still-doing-well2507217868.html. One possible explanation is diversification of portfolios. For example,
UnitedHealth Group has cut back their participation in the “money-losing” individual
market from thirty-four states to three and diversified into various other profitable areas,
such as data management, outpatient clinics, and surgical services. Jeff Sommer, Gripes About
Obamacare Aside, Health Insurers Are in a Profit Spiral, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 18, 2017), https://
www.nytimes.com/2017/03/18/business/health-insurers-profit.html.
24. Norris, supra note 15.
25. Id.
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already met these standards.26 Furthermore, the legislation permits
the Secretary of Health and Human Services “to adjust the MLR
standard for the individual market in a State if requiring issuers to
meet that standard may destabilize the individual market.”27 The
ratio’s purpose is not to impinge on financial viability; instead, it is
to provide a check on insurer’s expenses when the free market
alone has failed to do so. Ultimately, the MLR regulation acts as a
value guardrail. While market instability and an influx of costs
have pushed health insurance premiums upward, the MLR regulation has provided a much-needed check on profits and other
expenses to ensure a certain level of consumer value. Otherwise, this
value would be sacrificed for profits and shareholder dividends in
this abnormal market.
C. Extend the MLR Regulation to the Pharmaceutical Industry
This Note proposes applying a similar MLR regulation to the
pharmaceutical industry, another industry characterized by market
failure. Similar to its effect on the health insurance industry, this
ratio regulation would provide a much-needed check on excessive
profits in the pharmaceutical industry. It would also ensure a certain level of value for consumers. Instead of impinging on financial
viability, it would simply erect guardrails to stabilize this abnormal
pharmaceutical market. Doing so could also incentivize drug companies to right-size their drug prices. Although the MLR ratio
varies considerably by company, the ratio for the pharmaceutical
industry, and specifically for Big Pharma, currently hovers somewhere around 30% “medical loss” and 70% “other” expenses.28
Specifically, the pharmaceutical industry on average spends 70% of
revenue on its “other” expenses: 23% of its revenues on marketing,
30% on manufacturing, and 21% on profits.29 The “medical loss”
26. Still, less than half of the individual market insurers (43%) met the standard.
Explaining Health Care Reform: Medical Loss Ratio (MLR), KAISER FAMILY FOUND . (Feb. 29, 2012),
http://kff.org/health-reform/fact-sheet/explaining-health-care-reform-medical-loss-ratio-mlr/.
27. 45 C.F.R. § 158.101 (2017).
28. See infra notes 29 and 30.
29. In 2013, the profit margin for pharmaceutical companies ranged from 10% to 42%,
with an average of 18%. Pfizer was at the top of the profit list, and four other companies
(Hoffman-La Roche, AbbVie, GlaxoSmithKline, and Eli Lilly) had profit margins of more
than 20%. Richard Anderson, Pharmaceutical Industry Gets High on Fat Profits, BBC NEWS
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makes up about 30%, including 17% on R&D.30 Due to differences
between the two industries, this proposal acknowledges that the insurance industry’s 80:20 ratio may not be practical here.31 Therefore, this proposal recommends a ratio of 40:60 for the pharmaceutical industry and, if necessary, a profit cap around 12% (down
from the current 21%).32
Part II discusses how the healthcare market’s abnormal nature
results in market failure in the pharmaceutical market. Part III
enumerates the resultant disproportionate profit garnering in the
pharmaceutical industry. Part IV proposes the application of an
MLR regulation to the pharmaceutical industry to right this market,
laying out ratio details, the incentives that result from assigning
various expense categories to different sides of the ratio, and other
related reasoning. Furthermore, it argues that applying the MLR
regulation to the pharmaceutical industry provides a promising,

(Nov. 6, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/business-28212223. “[Twenty-one percent] is
the 2015 profit margin that Forbes estimated for the healthcare technology industry, making
it by far the most profitable industry of all, with major and generic pharmaceutical
companies leading the way. The company really setting the pace is Gilead Sciences
(NASDAQ:GILD), which has a profit margin of nearly 53% over the last 12 months.”
Speights, supra note 7. As a point of reference, the profit margin of pharmaceutical companies
was essentially the same as that of banks (19%), but the banks’ range of profit was lower,
from 5% to 29%. SUZANNE M. KIRCHHOFF, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42735, MEDICAL LOSS
RATIO REQUIREMENTS UNDER THE PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT (ACA):
ISSUES FOR CONGRESS (2014); Prabir Basu et al., Analysis of Manufacturing Costs in Pharmaceutical Companies, 3 J. OF PHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION 30, 30 (2008) (“In the pharmaceutical industry, costs attributed to manufacturing are a major part of a company’s total
expenses.”), available at https://www.researchgate.net/publication/225466494_Analysis_of
_Manufacturing_Costs_in_Pharmaceutical_Companies (accessed Mar. 13, 2018). “Manufacturing costs are a substantial part of their total cost structure. According to some estimates,
these costs can be as high as 27–30% of sales for manufacturers of brand-name pharmaceuticals, more than double the share of costs for research and Development.” Id.; Catherine
D. Deangelis, Big Pharma Profits and the Public Loses, 94 MILBANK Q. 30, 30–33 (2016); ROCHE
GROUP, FINANCE REPORT 2015, at 4 (2016), http://www.roche.com/dam/jcr:74af99eb-b51a
-4f13-88b2-aacaf9f53c0c/en/fb15e.pdf (Pfizer, Hoffmann-La Roche, AbbVie, GlaxoSmithKline, and Eli Lilly).
30. See also Ben Adams, The Top 10 Pharma R&D Budgets in 2016, FIERCEBIOTECH (Apr.
26, 2017), http://www.fiercebiotech.com/special-report/top-10-pharma-r-d-budgets-2016
(“On average last year, the top 10 Big Pharmas spent just over 17% of their top line on
research, with GlaxoSmithKline spending the second least in percentage terms at 12.9%, and
the least in absolute numbers at £3.62 billion ($4.49 billion).”).
31. See supra note 15.
32. See Deangelis, supra note 29, at 30; Anderson, supra note 32.

213

5.SCHIEL_FIN_NOHEADER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

8/17/18 10:42 AM

2018

collaborative solution to one of the nation’s most pressing healthcare cost conundrums. Part V concludes.
II. ABNORMAL MARKET FORCES IN THE HEALTHCARE INDUSTRY
RESULT IN MARKET FAILURE
Normal market forces usually curb a good’s price to a market
equilibrium—a price amenable to both buyer and seller.33
However, the unique arrangements in the American healthcare
industry effectuate a market that lacks these steadying forces.34
Normal market forces include buyers who are reasonably well
informed, make purchases independent of third-party payors (e.g.,
insurance companies), and have multiple choices among suppliers.35 These and other forces combine with basic supply and
demand principles to create price equilibrium.36 Admittedly, there
are areas in healthcare that could be categorized as “normal”
markets where healthcare is clearly a “product” for sale, such as
elective eye surgeries, Fitbits, and over-the-counter Tylenol. But the
market for prescription medication is anything but normal. In large
part, this is due to the fact that it lacks many of these normal
factors—quality and price transparency, independent buyers using
their own money, and multiple options of goods from which to
choose.37 Without the normal “free market” forces, the laws of

33. Robert J. Graham, How to Determine Price: Find Economic Equilibrium Between
Supply and Demand, DUMMIES, http://www.dummies.com/education/economics/how-to
-determine-price-find-economic-equilibrium-between-supply-and-demand (last visited Jan.
24, 2018); Fiona M. Scott Morton, The Problems of Price Controls, 24 REGULATION 50, 50 (2001)
(“The determining of market prices through the dynamic interaction of supply and demand
is the basic building block of economics. . . . This dynamic interaction produces an equilibrium market price; when buyers and sellers transact freely, the price that results causes
the quantity demanded by consumers to exactly equal the supply produced by sellers.”).
34. See Chris Ladd, There Is Never a ‘Free Market’ in Health Care, FORBES (Mar. 7, 2017,
10:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/chrisladd/2017/03/07/there-is-never-a-free-mar
ket-in-health-care/#2427c6b71147.
35. Alain C. Enthoven, Market Forces and Efficient Health Care Systems, 23 HEALTH AFF.
25, 25 (2004).
36. Id.
37. Shelby Livingston, Is the Price Right? Solving Healthcare’s Transparency Problem,
MOD. HEALTHCARE, http://www.modernhealthcare.com/reports/achieving-transparency
-in-healthcare/#!/ (“[T]he industry undoubtedly remains one of the nation’s most opaque.
The scarcity of price and quality information is often blamed for the high cost of care.”) (last
visited Dec. 20, 2017).
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supply and demand do not balance each other in a way that leads
to affordable pricing.
A. Lack of Transparency in the Pharmaceutical Industry
Contributes to Market Failure
In a normal market, consumers are well informed about their
needs and choices.38 For example, individuals know their shoe size
and preferred shoe styles, and they can research the prices and
quality of various shoes online or in stores.39 This information
empowers them to decide which shoes meet their needs, weigh the
price and quality options, and make reasoned decisions regarding
which shoes to buy. However, in the pharmaceutical industry
similar transparency is much more difficult due to information and
control asymmetries between patient and provider, a lack of
transparent pricing, and healthcare’s highly inelastic market.
1. Information and control asymmetries between physicians and patients
hamper consumer power
Prescription drug consumers consistently lack information that
is normally available to consumers in other markets. This partly
stems from power and information asymmetries between prescribers and their patients.40 Unlike shoe purchasers, ordinary
prescription drug consumers do not have the necessary training to
identify their health needs or the remedying medications.41 Rather,
38. See Enthoven, supra note 35, at 25.
39. Perfect Competition, ECONOMICS ONLINE, http://www.economicsonline.co.uk/Busi

ness_economics/Perfect_competition.html (last visited Feb. 12, 2018); see also Consumer Protection, ENCYCLOPEDIA.COM, http://www.encyclopedia.com/social-sciences-and-law/law
/law/consumer-product-safety-act (last visited Feb. 12, 2018) (discussing what information
consumers should reasonably be able to expect).
40. “The information asymmetry experienced by consumers, providers, and payers
shield these critical stakeholders from the information they need to make decisions about
what works best for them.” INST. OF MEDICINE, THE HEALTHCARE IMPERATIVE: LOWERING
COSTS AND IMPROVING OUTCOMES 335 (Pierre L. Yong, Robert S. Saunders & LeighAnne
Olson eds., 2010), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK53921/. “As a rule the doctor
has relevant information that the patient lacks.” Stephen Shmanske, Information Asymmetries
in Health Services: The Market Can Cope, 1 INDEP. REV. 191, 197 (1996).
41. Ariel Katz, Pharmaceutical Lemons: Innovation and Regulation in the Drug Industry,
14 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 1, 14 (2007).
Even more difficult for most consumers is knowing and evaluating the
expected long-term effects of the drug, the possible complications, or the reactions
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drug consumers are usually unaware of either the existence of or
the differences between prescription drugs like Prilosec and
Protonix, or Perjeta and Pegintron. And drugs are arguably more
complex than shoes and other commodities and require a certain
level of training to know which is appropriate for which medical
need. In fact, the reasons patients even go to doctors in the first
place include their extensive medical expertise and prescription
pads, both of which patients lack.42 They turn to the experts whose
years of training enable them to identify health needs, weigh
options, and then sign that pad—because without a prescriber’s
signature, patients cannot obtain prescription medication, even if
the information about the medical need or the prescribed medication were more transparent.43 The same is not true for shoes or
houses. Not even car or computer repairs require a graduate-level
licensed provider. In fact, with only a little training, consumers can
buy and change their own engine oil or tires. But with prescription
drugs the capacity to understand sufficiently the medical nuances
and to consider the choices, as well as the power to access the
prescription medication, lies with prescribers.44 Sometimes only the

with other substances. Moreover, even if they were affluent enough to do so,
because combining different drugs may be ineffective, or even lethal, consumers
cannot simply try every drug and every cure until they find the one that works.
They need to know before they commit to a specific drug that it is likely to work.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
42. See Shmanske, supra note 40, at 191 (“[O]ne type of asymmetric information occurs
because the doctor typically has knowledge the patient does not—that’s why the patient sees
the doctor in the first place.”).
43. “A drug intended for human use . . . shall be dispensed only (i) upon a written
prescription of a practitioner licensed by law to administer such drug . . . .” 21 U.S.C.
§ 353(b)(1)(B) (2012) (“The act of dispensing a drug contrary to the provisions of this paragraph
shall be deemed to be an act which results in the drug being misbranded while held for sale.”).
44. Katz supra, note 41.
Perhaps more importantly, however dramatic the effect of a drug on one
person may be, since the effect of drugs may vary from person to person,
meaningful information on drugs’ quality can be obtained only by looking at large
samples and carefully applying statistical methods. Not only is this type of
epidemiological research beyond the reach of consumers, it is also beyond the
reach of most practicing physicians. Therefore, if sellers (drug companies) have
better information about the efficacy and safety of their products, severe
asymmetry of information about the quality of drugs (their efficacy and safety)
may occur.
Id. at 14 (internal citations omitted).
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drug companies themselves have the information.45 Overall, the
information and power imbalances in the prescription drug industry place incredible power into the hands of healthcare providers,
beyond the reach of the average drug consumer.46 As such, the
consumer loses much of the ability to directly choose cheaper
products and thus coax prices down to reasonable levels. Furthermore, the cost of meeting with a provider for the prescription
further adds to the rising cost of drug distribution and other
healthcare costs.
Some argue that these asymmetries are inconsequential since
other markets with both information and power asymmetries, such
as car repairs and housing markets, have coped and achieved some
level of market equilibrium.47 However, both cars and houses are
some of our most expensive commodities, in part due to the potential for danger and resultant care we take to ensure our safety.
Furthermore, the potential inconvenience or additional cost resulting from a mistake in car repairs or a housing purchase is very
different than the potential bodily harm or even death resulting
from misguided medication prescription. Certainly, harm done to
a car or house can be costly. But it is much less personal.
Moreover, with individual differences in symptoms and anatomy, it is even harder for prescribers to know at the outset of a
45. The pharmaceutical companies have done the extensive chemical and epidemiological research on their products and are then responsible to disseminate that
information out to prescribers. Id. “Therefore, if sellers (drug companies) have better
information about the efficacy and safety of their products, severe asymmetry of information
about the quality of drugs (their efficacy and safety) may occur.” Id. at 14 n.65.
46. Charles Ornstein, Ryann Grochowski Jones & Mike Tigas, Drug-Company Payments
Mirror Doctors’ Brand-Name Prescribing, NPR (Mar. 17, 2016, 5:00 AM), http://www.npr
.org/sections/health-shots/2016/03/17/470679452/drug-company-payments-mirror-doc
tors-brand-name-prescribing (“A ProPublica analysis has found that doctors who receive
payments from the medical industry do indeed prescribe drugs differently on average than
their colleagues who don’t.”); Shmanske, supra note 40, at 198 (“[P]atients still have no
guarantee that competent, licensed doctors will not use their informational advantage for
personal gain.”).
47. See Shmanske, supra note 40, at 197.
The information asymmetry in the doctor-patient relationship is simply
another case of scarcity with which the market can cope. . . . Getting a second
opinion in health-care markets is comparable with comparison shopping in other
markets, yet no one claims that markets fail because prudent buyers of clothing
expend time, effort, and resources shopping or because would-be homebuyers
order termite inspections.
Id.
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medical encounter which medication is appropriate and how much
of it to prescribe.48 When someone walks into a hospital, the
provider cannot run a manufacturer-guided diagnostic or look up
the make and model to find the appropriate repair part like a car
mechanic can when changing engine oil or spark plugs. Finding the
right antibiotic, chemotherapy treatment, or more notably, the right
psychiatric medication, often requires time and periods of trial and
error, even for extensively trained physicians. This uncertainty
characterizes the healthcare market more so than other markets.49
This is why it is called a medical “practice.” Putting these decisions
into the hands of untrained buyers is almost unconscionable—
similar to handing car keys to a six-year-old. Consenting to the
information asymmetry is essentially an imperative to engage in
this market. Yet, at the same time, this asymmetry weakens buyer
power, and thus the forces to lower prices are insufficient to achieve
true price equilibrium.
2. Transparent drug pricing is often impractical, and the resultant lack
of price information further limits buyer power
Buyer power is also limited due to costs that are often opaque—
even less transparent than the need for or the fit of a specific
medication.50 Unlike shoes, prescription drugs are not price tagged,
nor do hospitals list drug prices on a sign above the welcome desk
like oil changes at a car repair shop.51 Prescribers don’t hand over a
priced menu during their hospital rounds when they ask, “Do you
prefer Zofran or Phenergan? Percocet or Norco?” In fact, doctors,
on average, discuss drug costs with only 2.6 out of 10 patients.52 At

48. Anna D. Sinaiko & Meredith B. Rosenthal, Increased Price Transparency in Health
Care—Challenges and Potential Effects, 364 NEW ENG. J. MED. 891, 891–93 (2011).
49. See Paul K.J. Han, William M.P. Klein & Neeraj K. Arora, Varieties of Uncertainty in
Health Care: A Conceptual Taxonomy, 31 MED. DECISION MAKING 828, 828–38 (2011).
50. Livingston, supra note 37 (“[T]he industry undoubtedly remains one of the nation’s
most opaque. The scarcity of price and quality information is often blamed for the high cost
of care.”) (last visited Dec. 20, 2017).
51. Cf. Featured Auto Services, WALMART, https://www.walmart.com/cp/auto-ser
vices/1087266 (last visited Dec. 27, 2017).
52. Doctors and Rx Prices: Ending the Silence, CONSUMER REP. (June 21, 2016), https://
www.consumerreports.org/drugs/doctors-and-rx-prices-ending-the-silence/ (“[Six] percent
of people currently taking a prescription drug found out about the cost of their new medication during a doctor’s visit, when the prescription was being written.”).
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times, this is because even the physicians are unaware of drug costs,
further limiting patients’ access to price information.53 Once the
medication is prescribed, nurses administering the ordered medication to the patients usually do not discuss the cost.54 Not only are
they similarly unaware of the price, but some would even consider
that type of discussion unethical.55
Drug prices are complicated. While consumers are usually
aware of their drug copay, the ultimate drug price is often obscured
by insurance rebates or discounts mandated to government payors
(e.g., Medicaid).56 This leads to elevated, ever-fluctuating list prices
that determine the consumers’ portion to be paid.57 Complex “drug
formularies” from the insurance companies further complicate
drug prices because consumers will pay vastly different amounts
depending on the drug status (e.g., cheaper “preferred drugs” or
generics, or expensive specialty and brand drugs).58 Even calling to
get a price estimate can be a fruitless endeavor. “It depends on your
insurance,” is a far-too-common response. Overall, drug prices are

53. See Livingston, supra note 37 (“[C]linicians often don’t know the price tag of the
medical services they provide.”).
54. See Lieberman & Ginsburg, supra note 3, at 1 (“The U.S. system for selling
prescription medicines involves multiple parties, differs markedly for generic and brand
drugs, has complex, nontransparent financial arrangements, and limits available information
in assymetric ways that disadvantage third-party payers and patients.”).
55. In my experience, nurses make efforts to save patients money in simple ways. But
when a patient is seriously ill the priority becomes the patient’s care and comfort. Price discussions become superfluous and insensitive.
56. “[T]he complex charges for prescription drugs often range from co-payments of
$15–$100 for ’preferred‘ drugs to 45% or more of the cost of specialty or non-preferred
drugs.” Grace-Marie Turner, Price Transparency Is Critical to Drug Pricing Solutions, FORBES
(July 11, 2017, 4:59 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/gracemarieturner/2017/07/11/price
-transparency-is-critical-to-drug-pricing-solutions/#1193fda5204a. “A huge system of drug
rebates and discounts happens behind the scenes in the pharmaceutical supply chain, further
distorting the market and confusing consumers about the actual price of a drug. Only a
trickle of these discounts and rebates actually reaches the consumer.” Id.
57. “Even though rebates paid by biopharmaceutical companies can substantially
reduce the prices insurers and pharmacy benefit managers (PBMs) pay for brand medicines,
insurers use list prices—rather than discounted prices—to determine how much to charge
patients when they pay their share, further increasing what consumers pay.” Id.
58. Insurance companies generally create complex “drug formularies” in which
their insured patients pay less for “preferred” drugs, especially generics, but can pay much
more for expensive brand and specialty drugs. Laurie Toich, Drug Rebates: Do Patients Really
Benefit?, AM. J. PHARMACY BENEFITS (Apr. 26, 2017), http://www.ajpb.com/news/drug
-rebates-do-patients-really-benefit; see also Turner, supra note 56.
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much less transparent than the prices of other products.59 Many
suppliers refuse even to disclose how they set prices.60 And even
when price transparency is not an issue, there is little patients can
do to shop around for the best price if they are locked in to an
insurance plan with a set drug copay. A copay that is always a set
amount irrespective of the drug prescribed further removes the
consumer from the cost information and reduces buyer power.
Furthermore, the urgent nature of healthcare itself differentiates it from other industries. Few persons would stop emergency
medical services in an ambulance or in the intensive care unit to
price-compare drugs or obtain approval from the consumer. Nor
does it do much good to explain to a patient undergoing surgery
the price of all the medicines the hospital has contracted to use for
anesthesia and preventive antibiotics. It is also unreasonable to
explain to sick, hospitalized patients (or their families) all of the
drugs that are being used in the patient’s care. These examples
demonstrate that pushing for drug price transparency to reduce the
cost of these particularly expensive areas in healthcare is impractical. Since consumers’ access to this information—and thus their
ability to compare quality and price—is severely limited, or even at
times impossible, buyer power rests mainly outside their control.
Instead, the buyer power lies dominantly in the hands of providers
and insurers.61
Admittedly, prescribers and patients have some increasing
access to the price of medications, as well as increased incentive to
pay attention.62 A price comparison may be accessible to patients

59. See Livingston, supra note 37 (“For the most part, consumers remain in the dark
about what they will be asked to pay after visiting a primary-care doctor or undergoing an
inpatient procedure. In that way, healthcare is unlike every other aspect of the consumer
experience in America. It would be unimaginable to leave a broken-down car with a mechanic before getting a cost estimate, for example. But in healthcare, ‘everyone’s flying blind.’”).
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. See, e.g., Patrick McGreevy, More Transparency Proposed for Prescription Drug Price
Increases Under Bill Passed by California Senate, L.A. TIMES (May 30, 2017, 4:33 PM), http://
www.latimes.com/politics/essential/la-pol-ca-essential-politics-updates-more-sunlight-pro
posed-for-prescription-1496186778-htmlstory.html (“Alarmed by skyrocketing prices for
some prescription drugs, the California Senate on Tuesday approved a measure aimed at
increasing pressure to hold down costs to consumers by requiring more public reporting of
price hikes.”); see also Livingston, supra note 37 (“[M]any other healthcare organizations,
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via a call to a local pharmacy or by visiting certain websites.63 The
majority of health plans (self-insured employers in particular) offer
cost-estimating tools for healthcare prices.64 And some insurance
companies list drug prices per drug tier.65 Yet sources indicate few
patients (three percent) actually compare costs of care among providers—often because they are unaware of the above-mentioned
tools.66 And frequently drug copays are set by the insurer or depend on the pharmacy, so price comparison at the time of prescribing would be practically useless.
3. Healthcare is a highly inelastic market
Most importantly, unlike a physical body, commodities like
shoes and cars can be replaced. In commodities markets, the repair,
maintenance, or inspection costs are all controlled by normal market forces, regardless of the information and power imbalances
inherent in the service. When shoes wear out, the consumer throws
them away and buys a new pair at a normal market rate. If the
repair costs for a damaged car outweigh replacement costs, the car
is “totaled.” The consumer compares the price and quality of new
models and uses what equity is left on the “totaled” car to purchase
a new one—again at a normal market rate.
Healthcare offers consumers no such alternatives. There is no
market-controlled replacement model available if cancer metastasizes throughout a body or when heart-failure-induced fluid buildup makes it difficult to breathe. Grandma isn’t “totaled” when her
urinary tract infections become resistant to normal antibiotics, nor
is mom when her cancer pain becomes unbearable. It is hard to cut
off funds for chronic pain or a failing body because, unlike a car,
from providers to insurers, are working to increase price transparency for the services they
provide, to varying degrees of success.”).
63. See, e.g., PHARMACYCHECKER.COM, https://www.pharmacychecker.com (last visited Jan. 19, 2017); SCRIPTSAVE WELLRX, https://www.wellrx.com/prescriptions (last visited Jan. 19, 2017).
64. See Livingston, supra note 37 (“Nearly all major health plans offer a cost-estimator
tool or contract with a third-party vendor to provide one so that commercially insured
patients can search for a common clinical service and obtain a cost estimate.”).
65. How Do Drug Tiers Work?, BLUE CROSS BLUE SHIELD BLUE CARE NETWORK OF
MICHIGAN, http://www.bcbsm.com/medicare/help/understanding-plans/pharmacy-pre
scription-drugs/tiers.html (last updated Oct. 2, 2017).
66. See Livingston, supra note 37.
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mom is irreplaceable. There is no “going market rate” for the price
of a loved one. Consumers cannot refuse to participate in this
market, so the medical bills pile up. In other words, this market is
highly inelastic; no matter how high prices rise, the demand for lifesaving drugs stays constant. As such, the costs of life-saving or
quality-of-life-enhancing prescription drugs from profit-maximizing companies know few market bounds. To illustrate, the biggest
cash cow for the pharmaceutical industry is oncology (worth
$78.9 billion).67 Pharmacyclics’ cancer drug Ibrutinib alone raked in
revenue over 67 times the R&D investment.68 Clearly, consumers’
usual qualms over paying astronomical prices were absent for this
product. Either they didn’t care what it cost, or they didn’t know—
probably both. In general, when cancer, or any other debilitating
mental or physical illness, rears its ugly head buyers have priorities
other than deal-shopping. In a way, it is a collective sense of humanity—an unwillingness to begrudge the funds needed in order
to save a life or prolong suffering—that throws normal market
forces out the window. The normal market is not designed for lifeor-death situations. Drugs are.
Combined together, the information imbalance between patient
and prescriber, opaque pricing information, and the strong sense of
empathy intrinsic to human nature all render the prescription drug
market uniquely inelastic. Consequently, with so much power outside consumer control, this market’s asymmetries of information
and control cripple the patient-buyer’s typical ability to compare
options, match them to their needs, and pick those options that are
simultaneously effective and affordable.69
67. Bryan Mc Govern, Why Consider Investing in Pharmaceutical Stocks?, INVESTING
NEWS (Jan. 1, 2018), https://investingnews.com/daily/life-science-investing/pharmaceut
ical-investing/investing-in-pharmaceutical-stocks/ (“The 2015 report from Statista also
reveals some of the biggest cash cows for the sector, with oncology pharma taking the lead
on an indicated value in sales of $78.9 billion.”).
68. Vinay Prasad & Sham Mailankody, Research and Development Spending to Bring a
Single Cancer Drug to Market and Revenues After Approval, 177 J. AM. MED. ASS’N INTERNAL
MED. 1569, 1572 (2017).
69. Ironically, even if we did have price transparency, it is not guaranteed to lower
costs. One Harvard Medical School study actually concluded that offering price estimators
did not necessarily lower costs; it often raised them, as people equated higher cost with
higher quality. See Livingston, supra note 37 (“[A] 2016 Harvard Medical School study . . .
found that offering employees a price-estimator tool (in the study’s case, the Truven calculator) did not lower healthcare spending. In fact, employees who used the tool ended up
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B. Third-Party Payors Further Frustrate Aspects of a Normal Market
The third-party payor role of health insurance is unlike other
types of insurance and further complicates this market. Consumers
in most commodity markets control their money when they transfer it directly to sellers in exchange for goods.70 For example, when
one buys groceries or a cell phone, the known amount of cash
transfers directly to the seller at the time the customer acquires the
goods. Even when the immediate exchange between buyer and
seller is obscured by an independent middleman, such as a credit
card company, the customer is usually aware of and responsible for
the whole price of the purchased item. Yet the middleman role
played by health insurers obscures the amount paid and insulates
the consumer from the loss.
A middleman is one who facilitates transactions between a
buyer and seller for a fee, often resulting in price increases.71
Insurers are a specific type of middleman. Unlike retailers or other
types of middlemen, insurers collect scheduled payments, or
premiums, from customers in exchange for a guarantee of some
compensation in the event of an expensive loss—such as an earthquake or hospital visit.72 In the event of such a loss, the customer
pays a portion as a deductible or out-of-pocket maximum, while
the insurer pays the rest.73 In essence, insurance transfers risk “from
an individual to a company,” pooling it with other individuals so
as to mitigate the losses felt by any one individual.74 Health insurers
thus use pooled resources to insulate the financial losses of
spending more than those who didn’t. The researchers suggested consumers could spend
more if they equate high cost with high quality.”). The Livingston article also quotes Alan
Sager, a Boston University professor of health law, policy, and management, offering his
opinion: “Asking patients to become informed about price and quality, and make
decisions about diagnosis and treatment in light of information about price and quality, I
think that’s largely a waste of time; and worse, it imposes radically unfair burdens on
many patients.” Id.
70. See Consumer Spending, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/c
/consumer-spending.asp (last visited Feb. 12, 2018).
71. Middleman, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/m/middleman
.asp (last visited Jan. 15, 2018).
72. CATHY PARETO, Introduction to Insurance, INVESTOPEDIA (2010), http://elibrary
.vssdcollege.ac.in/web/data/books-com-sc/bcom-3/Introduction%20To%20insurance.pdf.
73. Id.
74. Glossary of Insurance Terms, NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMMISSIONERS, http://www
.naic.org/consumer_glossary.htm (last visited Jan. 15, 2018).
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prescription drug (and other) costs felt by any one consumer. By its
very design, health insurance is meant to limit a consumer’s
exposure to healthcare costs. For some types of insurance (e.g., fire
or earthquake insurance) this design may not pose a substantial
cost burden. However, because health insurance is used much
more frequently than other types of insurance, costs escalate with
corresponding frequency.
1. The frequent need for health insurance burdens consumers more so
than other insurance types
Health insurance plays a much larger role in a person’s habitual
finances than other insurance types. For commodities like cars and
houses, an insurer’s role is largely limited to rarer catastrophic
situations like a car crash or fire.75 Yet health insurance pays for
much more than just catastrophes. While brake repairs or oil
changes are not covered by car insurance, preventive health screenings and other checkups are often covered by health insurance.
While car insurance does not pay for the gas needed to run the
engine, health insurance often covers drugs that must be taken on
a daily basis. While many may not need these daily medications
when they are young and healthy, few escape the infirmities of old
age. Additionally, one may have ailing dependents requiring
significant resources. Eventually, everyone needs health insurance.
In other words, unlike other insurance types, health insurance is
constantly necessary to help defray healthcare costs for a significant
number of people.
This unusually large role played by insurers in the pharmaceutical industry reduces consumers’ access to information and,
therefore, their ability to price discriminate between products.
Specifically, predetermined provider networks frustrate the impact
that price comparisons and second opinions have on promoting
competitive pricing the way they do in other markets.76 Usually
75. Mandated Car Insurance vs. Mandated Health Insurance: What’s the Difference?,
UNITED POLICYHOLDERS, http://www.uphelp.org/news/mandated-car-insurance-vs-man
dated-health-insurance-what%E2%80%99s-difference/2012-10-31 (last visited Jan. 15, 2018)
(“While health insurance covers preventive measures, including checkups and screenings,
as well as catastrophic events, such as cancer treatments, heart surgery or intensive care, auto
insurance doesn’t cover preventive measures such as oil changes and brake checks.”).
76. Preferred Provider Organization (PPO), HEALTHCARE.GOV, https://www.health
care.gov/glossary/preferred-provider-organization-PPO/ (last visited Jan. 15, 2018).
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insurance companies charge the same copay at any pharmacy in
their preferred network; seeing different providers within the
network doesn’t change that. And leaving the insurer’s preferred
network means paying more, which further limits patients’ choices.
This is vastly different than other types of insurance; for example,
car insurers don’t stipulate which mechanics to see or at what
dealer to shop. And changing health insurance companies in order
to find a cheaper provider usually isn’t an option because health
insurers are either chosen by an employer or changed once a year
on the Affordable Care Act’s individual marketplace. Thus, insurers play a more continuous and invasive role in healthcare than in
other markets—a role that proportionately limits drug consumers’
buyer power.
Over the years, the health insurer’s role has continued to
expand as the pharmaceutical cost burden has shifted from individuals to third-party payors. Between 1960 and 1988, direct outof-pocket expenditures fell 28%, while public financing increased
17.6% and private financing increased 10%.77 Even now, third
parties continue to shield costs. In 2015, 49% of Americans’ health
insurance was provided through an employer.78 In addition, almost
85% of those enrolled in the ACA exchanges received healthcare
subsidies from the government.79 In reality, only about ten cents on
every healthcare dollar are contributed directly from the patient.80
The remaining cost is negotiated by insurers and the government.81
One ironic result of this cost shielding is that the insured end
up paying more than they otherwise would, since normal pressures
77. Patricia M. Danzon, Health Care Industry, CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECONS.
(1993), http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc1/HealthCareIndustry.html.
78. Health Insurance Coverage of the Total Population, KAISER FAM. FOUND., https://
www.kff.org/other/state-indicator/total-population/?currentTimeframe=0&sortModel=%
7B%22colId%22:%22Location%22,%22sort%22:%22asc%22%7D (last visited Jan. 15, 2018)
(webpage allows the user to examine the health care coverage of the population using a
variety of filters).
79. See Louise Norris, Will You Receive an Obamacare Premium Subsidy?,
HEALTHINSURANCE.ORG (Jan. 1, 2017), https://www.healthinsurance.org/affordable-care-act
/will-you-receive-an-obamacare-premium-subsidy/.
80. John Graham, Opinion, Surprise Medical Bills: A Growing Problem Requiring Price
Transparency, FORBES (Dec. 1, 2016, 10:14 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/theapothecary
/2016/12/01/surprise-medical-bills-a-growing-problem-requiring-price-transparency/#38
9daf3b7d27.
81. Id.
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to prevent costs from rising do not exist. In the first two years of the
ACA’s enactment, out-of-pocket spending plunged 21.4% for the
poorest Americans.82 Yet, for the average American household,
premiums rose 12%, which computes to an even larger dollar
amount.83 Healthcare costs that were avoided by some were
compensated for by others. In essence, because health consumers
have historically been shielded from the true cost of healthcare,
without adequate government or normal market forces to rein in
expenses, healthcare costs have risen stiflingly high. For many, the
ACA has started to reverse the cost shielding trend by passing on
these inflated costs as higher premiums and deductibles. Yet for the
poorest, the cost shielding trend continues, and when consumers
are so heavily insulated from the price, price becomes a non-issue—
partly because it can’t be an issue. Insurers and other third parties
are necessary to aggregate the funds needed to cover elevated drug
prices and thus mitigate the financial loss felt by consumers. The
minimum-wage earner and the chronically sick could never afford
the prices necessary to recoup the millions or billions of dollars
required for a drug’s development, prescribers’ salaries, or other
costs.84 Free market advocates insist that eliminating the insurer
would bring costs down. But again, this is not a normal market.
Those most in need of the expensive care provided in this market
(such as nursing homes, intensive care units, and cancer drugs) are
often the least able to work to pay for it. Consequently, third parties
must continue to shield consumers from some expensive prescription drug costs.

82. Dan Mangan, Out-Of-Pocket Health Spending Dropped by Nearly 12 Percent—But
Premiums Rose After Obamacare Rolled Out, CNBC: HEALTH CARE (Jan 22, 2018, 2:31 PM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/01/22/out-of-pocket-health-spending-dropped-after-obama
care-rolled-out.html.
83. Id.
84. Cost to Develop and Win Marketing Approval for a New Drug is $2.6 Billion, TUFTS CTR.
FOR STUDY DRUG DEV. (Nov. 18, 2014), https://www.outsourcing-pharma.com/Article
/2016/03/14/Tufts-examines-2.87bn-drug-development-cost (“Developing a new prescription medicine that gains marketing approval, a process often lasting longer than a decade, is
estimated to cost $2,558 million . . . .”).
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2. Third-party payor costs contribute to elevated drug prices
Coordination among the various players in the healthcare
industry carries additional hidden costs.85 The overhead required
for the negotiating middlemen (e.g., insurance company employees
and executives, pharmacy benefit managers, pharmacists, drug
reps) continues to drive up prices.86 One notable example is pharmacy benefit managers (PBMs), on whom health plans depend for
negotiating reimbursement terms with retail pharmacies.87 These
negotiations derive revenues from a combination of fees from the
drug companies, as well as shared savings from the maintenance of
pharmacy networks.88
Ultimately, this unusually significant and disconnected thirdparty payor system both isolates consumers from financial loss and
escalates costs in the pharmaceutical industry—indeed, in the
whole healthcare system.89 With removed consumers and profitmaximizing middlemen, drug prices can rise unfettered.90
85. See Danzon, supra note 77.
86. See Jayne O’Donnell, Do Drug Benefit Managers Reduce Health Costs?, USA TODAY

(Mar. 3, 2014, 2:30 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/personalfinance/2014
/03/03/pharmacy-benefit-managers-healthcare-costs-savings/5495317/ (“As more people
become insured under the Affordable Care Act, PBMs will become both more profitable and
powerful, which could thwart efforts to keep drug costs down, some critics say. Express
Scripts, for example, is ranked 24th on the Fortune 500, thanks in part to its $29 billion deal
to buy Medco last year. Last month, the company said it expects to have 10% to 20% growth
in earnings per share for the next several years, thanks to ‘health care trends, industry
positioning and the overall environment.’”); Rob Sawicki, How Insurance Companies Drive Up
the Cost of Life-Saving Drugs for Patients, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 4, 2015, 12:37 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/rob-sawicki/how-insurance-companies-d_b_8710216.html;
Turner, supra note 56 (“Caterpillar moved away from its PBM, suspecting that a quarter of
the manufacturer’s $150 million annual drug bill was being wasted.”).
87. See Lieberman & Ginsburg, supra note 3, at 1 (“Health plans rely heavily on
contracted pharmacy benefit managers (PBMs) to negotiate reimbursement terms on their
behalf with retail pharmacies. However, PBMs also operate mail-order pharmacies, giving
them knowledge of actual generic drug costs. . . . This disincentive to keep generic drug
reimbursement low for their health plan client poses an apparent conflict of interest for PBMs
and increases health plan spending to the extent that a lack of information about actual
generic drug costs leads to excessive reimbursement.”).
88. Pharmacy Benefit Managers, HEALTH AFFAIRS 1, 2 (2017), https://www.healthaffairs
.org/do/10.1377/hpb20171409.000178/full/healthpolicybrief_178.pdf.
89. See Lieberman & Ginsburg, supra note 3, at 1; see also Danzon, supra note 77.
90. See Paul Fronstin & Jack VanDerhei, Savings Medicare Beneficiaries Need for Health
Expenses: Some Couples Could Need as Much as $350,000, 38 EMP. BENEFIT RES. INST. NOTES 1, 7
(2017), https://www.ebri.org/pdf/notespdf/EBRI_Notes_Hlth-Svgs.v38no1_31Jan17.pdf;
see also Norris, supra note 79.
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C. Monopolistic Features Increase Drug Prices
Normal markets provide consumers with options.91 A market
composed of multiple players prevents one seller from elevating a
product’s prices out of control, since buyers can buy the lowerpriced option.92 Alternatively, a monopolized market lacks the rivalry between players that manages price and quality.93 This dearth
of competition concentrates selling power in the hands of a single
player.94 That player then has total control to raise prices.95 In most
markets, antitrust laws, such as the Federal Trade Commission Act,
prevent monopolies and promote cost-curbing conditions.96
However, the American pharmaceutical industry actually facilitates monopolies.97 In some cases, medication and treatment options are limited because science hasn’t advanced and few cures
exist.98 However, in many cases patents restrict choices by blocking
innovation of new or improved products.99 As defined by statute, a
patent is “the right to exclude others from making, using, offering
for sale, or selling . . . or importing the invention.”100 While patents
91. See Enthoven, supra note 35, at 25–27.
92. Perfect Competition, supra note 39.
93. Monopoly, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/m/monopoly.asp

(last visited Jan. 15, 2018).
A monopoly is characterized by the absence of competition, which can lead
to high costs for consumers, inferior products and services, and corrupt behavior. A company that dominates a business sector or industry can use that
dominance to its advantage, and at the expense of others. It can create artificial
scarcities, fix prices, and otherwise circumvent natural laws of supply and
demand. It can impede new entrants into the field, discriminate, and inhibit
experimentation or new product development, while the public—robbed of the
recourse of using a competitor—is at its mercy. A monopolized market often
becomes an unequal, and even inefficient, one.
Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. The Antitrust Laws, FED. TRADE COMMISSION, https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice
/competition-guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/antitrust-laws (last visited Dec. 28, 2017).
97. See Aaron S. Kesselheim, Jerry Avorn & Ameet Sarpatwari, The High Cost of Prescription Drugs in the United States: Origins and Prospects for Reform, 316 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 858,
859 (2016).
98. 8 Diseases for Which We Still Haven’t Found a Cure, EMGN.COM, http://emgn
.com/entertainment/8-diseases-still-havent-found-cure/ (last visited Dec. 28, 2017).
99. “[T]he current system is not working well . . . the most notable current feature of
pharmaceutical innovation is the huge ‘drought’ in the development of new products.”
Michele Boldrin & David K. Levine, The Case Against Patents, 27 J. ECON. PERSP. 3, 13 (2013).
100. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2012).
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help drug makers recoup R&D costs, they also restrict the choices
available to consumers.101 These market exclusivity rights bypass
normal market safeguards and create an ideal environment for
single-product domination.102 As to be expected, this monopolization pushes up prices. In fact, the 2013 per capita spending for
drugs in America was $858—over twice the $400 average of
nineteen other industrialized nations (many with governmentmandated drug price controls).103 Further exacerbating rising prices
is the requirement imposed on the majority of U.S. government
drug payment plans (e.g., Medicare Part D) to cover nearly all drug
products.104 Under this requirement, drug companies can charge
whatever they like, and insurers must pay for products if
prescribed. Admittedly, prior authorizations and other tools do
serve as a check on prices.105 Yet as a whole, these pharmaceutical
monopolies are a substantial factor in unrestricted prescription
drug prices. It is true that patents provide the incentives for drug
companies to take on the lengthy and risky process of developing
new drugs. Thus, the solution may not be to get rid of the patent
system. Instead, there may be a way to alter the market structure as
a whole to allow for both patents and some restraint on drug prices.
D. Without Normal Market Forces, Basic Supply and Demand
Fail to Establish Price Equilibrium
The tension between supply and demand normally keeps a
good’s price within a manageable range.106 Yet as explained in
subsections A through C, this is not a normal market. The demand
is almost constant for healthcare services, especially for long-term
conditions, and thus buyer power is significantly weaker than in
101. See Kesselheim et al., supra note 97.
102. See id.
103. Id.
104. See id.
105. “Prior authorization is a requirement from your insurance company to your

physician. The physician has to get specific medications (or operations) approved by the
insurance company before the insurance company will provide full (or any) coverage for
them.” Prior Authorization for Prescription Drugs: All You Need to Know, HEALTH MARKETS
(Mar. 17, 2016), https://www.healthmarkets.com/resources/health-insurance/prior-author
ization-for-prescription-drugs/.
106. Adam Hayes, Economics Basics: Supply and Demand, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www
.investopedia.com/university/economics/economics3.asp (last visited Dec. 28, 2017).
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other normal markets. Without the buyer power to counteract the
massive patent-enhanced seller power, a balanced price equilibrium is near impossible.
1. In general, supply and demand in normal markets result in all-around
satisfactory prices
As demand rises, sellers can raise the price of a good without
fear of alienating buyers.107 For example, if a substantial number
of buyers desire a Tesla sports car, producers can raise prices and
still sell plenty of cars.108 But when a good’s price rises higher than
the buyer’s ability or desire to pay, demand drops.109 For example,
some demand for the Tesla is lost because of its exorbitant price. On
the other hand, when demand decreases too low—like for a United
Airlines flight after a scandal—so does the price.110 In order to
maximize profits, sellers will attempt to produce and advertise
more of the higher-priced merchandise (e.g., a Tesla car or the latest
edition iPhone) over a cheaper model because the return on
investment is much higher.111 Together, supply and demand balance each other to reach a price equilibrium—an attractive price for
both buyers and sellers.112
107. See Pricing Products, LUMEN LEARNING, https://www.boundless.com/business
/textbooks/boundless-business-textbook/product-and-pricing-strategies-15/pricing-products
-96/impacts-of-supply-and-demand-on-pricing-449-1939/ (last visited Dec. 28, 2017) (“If
demand increases and supply is unchanged, then it leads to a higher equilibrium price and
higher quantity. If demand decreases and supply is unchanged, then it leads to a lower
equilibrium price and lower quantity.”).
108. See Zachary Shahan, Tesla’s 2016 Deliveries = 76,230+ Vehicles, Production = 83,922
Vehicles, CLEAN TECHNICA (Jan. 3, 2017), https://cleantechnica.com/2017/01/03/teslas
-2016-deliveries-production/.
109. See Irena Asmundson, Supply and Demand: Why Markets Tick, INT’L MONETARY
FUND, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/basics/suppdem.htm (last updated
July 29, 2017).
110. Law of Supply and Demand, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/l
/law-of-supply-demand.asp (last visited Dec. 28, 2017); see also Marquita Harris, United Is
Offering “Apology Fares” That Include Cheap Flights to Europe, REFINERY29 (Apr. 26, 2017,
6:00 PM), http://www.refinery29.com/2017/04/151846/united-airlines-apology-fares-cheap
-flights (“Prices have dropped significantly in less than two weeks. Those hefty discounts
include: ‘round-trip flights to Trinidad and Tobago for as little as $274 (typically $550); flights
to Paris for $433 (typically $800); and round-trip fares to Mexico City for less than $200
(typically $500),’ as noted by the site.”).
111. See Asmundson, supra note 109 (“The higher the price, the more suppliers are
likely to produce.”).
112. Graham supra, note 33.
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Yet without normal market forces, the pharmaceutical industry
cannot establish this price equilibrium. Without the usual access to
prices or the needed expertise to understand their needs and options,
uninformed consumers cannot make informed choices between
products. Nor are they always aware of increasing drug prices,
especially when third-party payors veil the costs.113 Likewise, when
a rare, life-changing drug has a monopoly on the market, the
(inelastic) demand for this drug remains elevated—like that of the
latest iPhone—but without any incentive to reduce and normalize
the price for those waiting for the price reduction. In fact, per the
principles of supply and demand, drug companies will spend
billions of dollars on aggressive marketing strategies to promote
more of their high-margin prescription drugs (like the Teslas and
iPhones) and thus achieve higher profits.114 With profits feeding
marketing expenses and further profits, and buyer power severely
diminished, price equilibrium is nearly impossible to achieve.
2. Long-term conditions ensure demand, further distorting
price equilibrium
Long-term conditions further weaken buyer power.115 Those
with chronic health conditions, such as diabetes, congestive heart
failure, and Parkinson’s disease, depend on medications to manage
symptoms.116 Additionally, one in twenty-five adults is living with
113. See Ginger Skinner, To Get the Lowest Drug Prices It Pays to Shop Around, CONSUMER
REP. (Dec. 14, 2017), https://www.consumerreports.org/drug-prices/why-drug-costs-keep
-rising-what-you-can-do-about-it/.
114. See Peterson, supra note 8 (“The companies raised prices—not to fund research to
discover new drugs—but to boost profits for executives and investors.”).
115. David Ferguson, Most Healthcare Providers Unprepared for Longitudinal Care,
FIERCEHEALTHCARE (Dec. 2, 2015, 11:01 AM), http://www.fiercehealthcare.com/healthcare
/most-healthcare-providers-unprepared-for-longitudinal-care.
116. See, e.g., Diabetes: Symptoms and Causes, MAYO CLINIC (July 31, 2014), http://
www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/diabetes/basics/complications/con-20033091;
Understand Heart Failure, AM. HEART ASS’N, http://www.heart.org/HEARTORG/Condi
tions/HeartFailure/Heart-Failure_UCM_002019_SubHomePage.jsp (last visited Dec. 30,
2017) (“Although it can be difficult to live with a chronic condition like heart failure, you can
learn to manage the symptoms and live a full and enjoyable life.”); Understanding Parkinson’s,
PARKINSON’S FOUND., http://www.pdf.org/about_pd (last visited Dec. 30, 2017). Wellbutrin
(an antipsychotic) and diltiazem (for heart rhythm problems) must be taken daily—
sometimes up to four times a day. Diltiazem (Oral Route), MAYO CLINIC, http://www
.mayoclinic.org/drugs-supplements/diltiazem-oral-route/proper-use/DRG-20071775
(“For oral dosage form (tablets): Adults—At first, 30 milligrams (mg) four times a day before
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a debilitating mental illness—including bipolar disorder and longterm recurring major depression.117 In fact, one in six Americans
takes psychiatric medication, and eight out of ten of those report
long-term use.118 While much controversy surrounds the use of
psychotropic medications, they can often both improve symptoms
and increase the effectiveness of other treatments, like psychotherapy.119 Overall, this guaranteed demand removes these consumers’ ability to choose to forego the drug product, tipping the
meals and at bedtime. Your doctor may increase your dose if needed.”); Medications for
Arrhythmia, AM. HEART ASS’N, http://www.heart.org/HEARTORG/Conditions/Arrhyth
mia/PreventionTreatmentofArrhythmia/Medications-for-Arrhythmia_UCM_301990_Arti
cle.jsp#.WdlBMbpFzIU; Lisa Rapaport, Many Patients Skip Prescribed Drugs After a Heart
Attack, REUTERS (June 3, 2015), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-heart-medication/ma
ny-patients-skip-prescribed-drugs-after-a-heartattackidUSKBN0OJ2M720150603; Wellbutrin
SR, RXLIST, http://www.rxlist.com/wellbutrin-sr-drug.htm (“The usual adult target dose
for WELLBUTRIN SR is 300 mg per day, given as 150 mg twice daily.”); Lisa Rapaport, Many
Patients Skip Prescribed Drugs After MI, REUTERS (June 2, 2015), https://uk.reuters.com
/article/us-heart-medication/many-patients-skip-prescribed-drugs-after-mi-idUKKBN0OI2
KU20150602.
117. E.g., Shaunak A. Ajinkya, Pradeep R. Jadhav & Shruti Rajamani, Which Is A More
Debilitating Disorder Schizophrenia or Dysthymia?—A Comparative Study, 9 J. CLINICAL &
DIAGNOSTIC RES. 1, 1 (2015) (“Schizophrenia and Dysthymia are debilitating disorders that
affect general health and functioning.”); Living with a Mental Health Condition, NAT’L
ALLIANCE ON MENTAL ILLNESS, https://www.nami.org/Find-Support/Living-with-a-Men
tal-Health-Condition (last visited Dec. 30, 2017) (“[A]cross the population, 1 in every 25
adults is living with a serious mental health condition such as schizophrenia, bipolar
disorder or long-term recurring major depression.”); ’Monkey Mind’: When Debilitating
Anxiety Takes Over, NPR (July 3, 2012, 1:30 PM), http://www.npr.org/2012/07/03/156
200170/monkey-mind-when-debilitating-anxiety-takes-over (“For some, anxiety can be
much more than just sweaty palms and quivering hands. It can be a debilitating condition
with severe physical and mental effects.”).
118. Thomas J. Moore & Donald R. Mattison, Adult Utilization of Psychiatric Drugs and
Differences by Sex, Age, and Race, 177 J. AM. MED. ASS’N INTERNAL MED. 274, 274 (2017) (“[An
estimated] 11.5% of adults reported taking prescription medication for ‘problems with
emotions, nerves, or mental health’ in 2011.”); Sara G. Miller, 1 in 6 Americans Takes a Psychiatric Drug, SCI. AM. (Dec. 13, 2016), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/1-in-6
-americans-takes-a-psychiatric-drug/ (“[M]ore than eight in 10 adults who were taking
psychiatric drugs reported long-term use . . . .”).
119. Laura Weiss Roberts & Shaili Jain, Ethical Issues in Pharmacology, PSYCHIATRIC
TIMES (May 7, 2011), http://www.psychiatrictimes.com/articles/ethical-issues-psycho
pharmacology (“There are also concerns about the widespread application (some would say
overprescription) of psychotropics—a controversy that is further fueled by the fact that
nonpsychiatric providers are the source of most psychotropic prescriptions in the United
States.”); see also Mental Illness: Diagnosis & Treatment, MAYO CLINIC, http://www.mayo
clinic.org/diseases-conditions/mental-illness/basics/treatment/con-20033813 (last visited
Dec. 30, 2017) (“Although psychiatric medications don’t cure mental illness, they can often
significantly improve symptoms. Psychiatric medications can also help make other treatments, such as psychotherapy, more effective.”).
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power heavily in favor of the drug producer.120 For some, medication and other mental health services mean the difference
between holding down a steady job or complete dependence on
disability programs.121 Interestingly, providing access to psychotropic medication saves the U.S. healthcare system around $25
billion annually in reduced admissions to mental institutions.122
The inverse has also been demonstrated. “[S]tudies have shown
that when patients’ access to psychotropic drugs is arbitrarily
restricted by insurers, patients use hospital care at a cost to those
insurers that greatly exceeds the drug cost savings they foolishly
attained.”123 This is because regular adherence to costly medications is critical to a stable health condition and, thus, to being a
productive member of society.124 Unlike in normal markets for
Teslas or iPhones, the poor cannot always wait for the rich to buy
enough of the prescription medication so that prices deflate
enough. Deciding to forego the latest iPhone or Tesla does not
carry the same consequences as foregoing psychiatric or heart
medication. Producers of drugs for chronic health conditions are
practically guaranteed a constant, long-term demand of a mostly
inelastic market. In fact, eighty-six percent of all healthcare

120. See Rapaport, supra note 116 (“‘Ultimately, regardless of the reason, patient nonadherence to medications after a heart attack has been associated with poor outcomes—these
can include repeat hospitalization, progression of their underlying disease, or even reduced
survival,’ said Mathews, a researcher at Duke University Medical Center in Durham,
North Carolina.”).
121. Robert E. Drake, Jonathan S. Skinner, Gary R. Bond & Howard H. Goldman, Social
Security and Mental Illness: Reducing Disability with Supported Employment, 28 HEALTH AFF.
761, 761 (2009) (suggesting that providing supported employment along with “mental health
care would improve financial security” of people with serious mental illnesses and “could
even save the government money”).
122. J.D. Kleinke, The Price of Progress: Prescription Drugs in the Health Care Market, 20
HEALTH AFF. 43, 47 (2001) (“According to a study by Lichtenberg, ‘Drug treatments have
saved the cost of keeping about 400,000 patients in mental institutions about $25 billion annually.’”).
123. Id.
124. See, e.g., Kimberly Holland & Valencia Higuera, The Dangers of Abruptly Stopping
Antidepressants, HEALTHLINE (Apr. 3, 2017), https://www.healthline.com/health/depression
/dangers-of-stopping-antidepressants (“Quitting without consulting your doctor can be lifethreatening.”); see also Rapaport, supra note 116 (“‘Ultimately, regardless of the reason,
patient non-adherence to medications after a heart attack has been associated with poor
outcomes—these can include repeat hospitalization, progression of their underlying disease,
or even reduced survival,’ said Mathews, a researcher at Duke University Medical Center in
Durham, North Carolina.”).
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spending is for patients with one or more chronic conditions.125 In
this way, the pharmaceutical industry is unlike any other, not
subject to normal market forces and consumer pressures. In other
words, prices cannot reach equilibrium because buyers cannot
refuse to buy, leaving sellers with little reason to cut prices.
E. Summary: The Pharmaceutical Industry Cannot Be a Normal Market
Consumers are relatively powerless to rein in drug companies’
prices. Near-constant demand and little buyer power tips the
balance of power heavily in the hands of the drug companies.
Without typical market forces to provide balance, the industry
cannot achieve price equilibrium. Around the world, governments
usually step in to help manage prices from getting out of control.126
Yet American lawmakers have imposed relatively few price
constraints on prescription drugs.127 Instead, Americans have
chosen to depend on normal market forces and public opinion in
order to curb these prices, with only minimal impact.128 Again,
without aspects of normal markets like quality and price transparency, independent buyers dealing directly with sellers, and
monopolistic safeguards in the prescription drug market, basic
supply and demand principles operate such that drug producers
are free to set exorbitant prices.129 Only as more consumers feel the
painful monetary losses through insurance premium hikes will this
“price gouging” garner enough public attention to effectuate
lower prices.130
125. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVICES, AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RES. & QUALITY,
AHRQ PUB. NO. 14-0038, MULTIPLE CHRONIC CONDITIONS CHARTBOOK 7 (2014), https://
www.ahrq.gov/sites/default/files/wysiwyg/professionals/prevention-chronic-care/deci
sion/mcc/mccchartbook.pdf (“[Eighty-six percent] of healthcare spending is for patients
with one or more chronic conditions.”).
126. See Asmundson, supra note 109 (“As a result, governments usually regulate such
monopolies to ensure that they do not abuse their market power by setting prices too high.”).
127. Erin Fox, How Pharma Companies Game the System to Keep Drugs Expensive, HARV.
BUS. REV. (Apr. 6, 2017), https://hbr.org/2017/04/how-pharma-companies-game-the-system
-to-keep-drugs-expensive.
128. Jay Hancock, Everyone Wants to Reduce Drug Prices. So Why Can’t We Do It?, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 23, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/23/sunday-review/prescription
-drugs-prices.html.
129. See Kesselheim et al., supra note 97.
130. Is There a Cure for High Drug Prices?, CONSUMER REP., https://www.consumer
reports.org/drugs/cure-for-high-drug-prices (last updated July 29, 2016).
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With the healthcare industry hanging in the balance, this
unrestrained market has ceded significant price control to profitamplifying corporations in the pharmaceutical industry.131 One
physician remarked that the prices of cancer drugs have soared so
high “that we are getting into areas that are almost unimaginable
economically.”132 In the insurance industry, the ACA has begun to
bring insurers’ margins to a reasonable level by enforcing the health
insurance MLR regulation—with undeniable success at reducing
waste.133 Yet the pharmaceutical industry has thus far eluded any
such value mandate, despite similarities in market abnormalities
and even starker shareholder manipulation than the insurance
industry.134 Consequently, the abnormal market conditions, combined with a lack of moderating regulations, have led to pronounced profit-taking in the pharmaceutical industry.
III. PRONOUNCED PROFIT-TAKING EXISTS
IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY
Without normalizing market forces at play, pharmaceutical
companies are left unchecked to reap skyrocketing profits. As they
recoup their profits, these companies simultaneously neglect development of some less profitable, albeit much-needed, drugs.
A. The Pharmaceutical Industry Reaps Mammoth Profits
The priority of for-profit corporations is to maximize the return
on shareholders’ investments. The landmark case of Dodge v. Ford
Motor Co. noted explicitly that a business’s primary purpose is to
amplify the “profit of the stockholders.”135 Although more observation than a binding rule, this “shareholder primacy norm”
theory both captures and strengthens the widespread approach of
131. See Fox, supra note 127.
132. Gina Kolata, What Does It Cost to Create a Cancer Drug? Less Than You’d Think, N.Y.

TIMES (Sept. 11, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/11/health/cancer-drug-costs.html.
133. See PRIVATE HEALTH INSURANCE, supra note 18.
134. See, e.g., Andrew Pollack, Martin Shkreli Resigns from Turing Pharmaceuticals, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 18, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/19/business/martin-shkreli-re
signs-turing-drug-company.html.
135. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919); Marshall M. Magaro,
Note, Two Birds, One Stone: Achieving Corporate Social Responsibility Through the ShareholderPrimacy Norm, 85 IND. L.J. 1149, 1153 (2010) (discussing shareholder wealth maximization).
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pharmaceutical companies. Unlike other developed countries, the
United States grants drug companies free rein to charge “whatever
they want.”136 Medicare isn’t even allowed to negotiate drug
prices.137 So, unhindered by normal market forces, the pharmaceutical industry has magnified this Dodge charge to amplify
stockholder profit.
The major drug companies’ profits are substantial. Generally
included in the term “Big Pharma” are fifteen pharmaceutical
giants, notably Johnson & Johnson ($276 billion market value),
Novartis ($273 billion), and Roche ($248 billion).138 They enjoy
significant yearly shareholder yields and profit margins.139 While
the S&P 500 companies realize a median of 2% shareholder yields
(or payouts to stockholders), those of Big Pharma are well above that;
Pfizer’s shareholder yields, for example, were over 6% in 2015.140 As
for average profit margins, the pharmaceutical industry was at the
top of a 2013 Forbes study, right next to the banking industry, at a
19% profit margin.141 Five of the Big Pharma companies made profit
margins of 20% or higher.142 In comparison, the industries with the
next-highest average profit margins were the media, 12%; oil and

136. Deangelis, supra note 29, at 30–31 (“What has accounted for the pharmaceutical
companies’ very large profit margins? For one thing, the United States, unlike other developed countries, allows pharmaceutical companies to charge whatever they want as long as
they do not collude with one another in setting the prices. In other words, these companies
can charge whatever the market will bear. For example, Solvadi, Gilead’s hepatitis C drug,
costs $1,000 for each pill, which amounted to sales of $3.5 billion between April and June
of 2015.”).
137. Id. at 31 (“Making matters worse, the US Congress, influenced by pharmaceutical
lobbyists, has not allowed Medicare to negotiate drug prices, as do most health care systems,
HMOs, and some insurance companies. In those countries that negotiate the prices of their
national insurance plans with Big Pharma, most drugs sell for much less. Obviously,
lobbyists for the pharmaceutical industry in the United States have been very successful.”).
138. Compare Williams, supra note 7 (identifying market values of pharmaceutical
companies), with Dan Caplinger, How Much Is the Coca-Cola Company Worth?, MOTLEY FOOL
(Sept. 6, 2016, 12:16 PM), https://www.fool.com/investing/2016/09/06/how-much-is-the
-coca-cola-company-worth.aspx (identifying Coca-Cola’s net worth at $188–213 billion).
139. See generally Jeremy Jones, Calculating Shareholder Yield, YOUNG RES. & PUB.,
INC. (Apr. 27, 2017), https://www.youngresearch.com/authors/jeremyjones/calculating
-shareholder-yield (showing that shareholder yields are returned capital divided by
market capitalization).
140. Williams, supra note 7.
141. Id.
142. See Anderson, supra note 32 (identifying the companies as Pfizer, Hoffmann-La
Roche, AbbVie, GlaxoSmithKline, and Eli Lilly).
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gas, 8%; and car manufacturers, 6%.143 Big Pharma’s profits are
almost twice those of the next-highest industry. This trend doesn’t
seem to be changing any time soon, considering that another Forbes
study in 2015 found the average profit margin of healthcare
technology companies was now 21%.144 The 2015 profit margins for
Johnson & Johnson were 22%; Roche, 20%; and Novartis, 36% (when
comparing profits over sales).145 But the company Forbes found to be
setting the pace was Gilead Sciences, with a profit margin nearly 53%
over a one-year period.146 With margins sometimes three-fold those
of other profitable industries, it’s no wonder these companies
attract investors.147
Maintaining these returns necessitates consistently elevating
pharmaceutical prices. Despite the recent upsurge in the proportion
of cheaper generic versions used to fill prescriptions (82% in 2016,
compared to 66% in 2010), brand versions have maintained their
roughly 78% market share of overall profits.148 To maintain those
profits, the drug companies implemented 17% annual price hikes, at
a time when general inflation averaged 1.62%.149 In recent years, the
news has exposed instances of price gouging and opportunistic
profit-taking. For example, Europe and Canada sold the generic
drug deflazacort, a steroid used to treat children with Duchenne

143. See id.
144. See supra note 7.
145. JOHNSON & JOHNSON CO., A NNUAL REPORT (FORM 10-K) (Jan. 3, 2016); NOVARTIS,

NOVARTIS ANNUAL REPORT 2015 (2015), https://www.novartis.com/sites/www.novartis
.com/files/novartis-annual-report-2015-en.pdf (last visited Jan. 25, 2018); ROCHE GROUP,
FINANCE REPORT 2015 (2015), http://www.roche.com/dam/jcr:74af99eb-b51a-4f13-88b2
-aacaf9f53c0c/en/fb15e.pdf.
146. See supra note 7.
147. Hugh Dive, Investing in Biotech and Pharma, AURORA FUNDS MGMT., http://www
.aurorafunds.com.au/investing-in-biotech-and-pharma (last visited Apr. 7, 2018) (“Biotechnology and pharmaceuticals are probably the most seductive and exciting sectors of the
market to invest in. Not only can investors have the warm and fuzzy feeling that they are
helping humanity (an emotion not readily generated by buying shares in Westpac or BHP), but
when drugs or devices are developed and successfully adopted, it can be very profitable.”).
148. BLUE CROSS BLUE SHIELD ASS’N, HEALTH OF AMERICA REPORT, RISING COSTS FOR
PATENTED DRUGS DRIVE GROWTH OF PHARMACEUTICAL SPENDING IN THE U.S. (May 3, 2017),
https://www.bcbs.com/sites/default/files/file-attachments/health-of-america-report/BC
BS.HealthOfAmericaReport.RisingCostsPatentedDrugs_1.pdf.
149. Id; see also Historical Inflation Rates 1914-2018, US INFLATION CALCULATOR, http://
www.usinflationcalculator.com/inflation/historical-inflation-rates (last visited Apr. 7, 2018).
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muscular dystrophy, at a price between $1000 to $2000 per year.150
Yet the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has approved
Marathon Pharmaceuticals to sell the same drug in the United
States for $89,000 (a 6000% price increase) under the brand name
Emflaza.151 Other notable examples include Turing Pharmaceuticals’ Daraprim ($750 per pill, as increased from $13.50), and
AMAG Pharmaceuticals’ Makena ($1500 per pill, while a different
but similar drug was sold for $20).152 Although Turing Pharmaceuticals’ former CEO Martin Shkreli was recently convicted for
fraud, the conviction was for securities and conspiracy but had
nothing to do with Daraprim price hikes.153 Altogether, there seem
to be few checks on these price hikes—especially when there are
such profits to be made!
B. Big Pharma’s Expenses Spur Their Profits
The cost of moving a drug to the profit-making stage is significant. It takes ten to fifteen years to research and develop one
drug154 at an average cost between $648 million to $2.65 billion.155
Many drugs fail at various steps along the way, resulting in millions of dollars of lost funds.156 Estimates suggest only one out of
every 5000 to 10,000 drugs makes it to clinical trials.157 From there,
only three out of ten are profitable, and only one of these three
becomes a blockbuster drug grossing at least $1 billion per year.158
Patents compensate for these risks and protect a company from
competition, maximizing a drug’s return. Yet over the last few
150. Matthew Herper, Why Did That Drug Price Increase 6,000%? It’s the Law, FORBES
(Feb. 10, 2017, 1:52 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/matthewherper/2017/02/10/a-6000
-price-hike-should-give-drug-companies-a-disgusting-sense-of-deja-vu/#348085ca71f5.
151. Id.
152. See id.; see also Pollack, supra note 134.
153. Aaron Smith, Martin Shkreli Sentenced to 7 Years in Prison for Fraud, CNN MONEY
(Mar. 9, 2018, 5:25 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2018/03/09/news/martin-shkreli-sentencing
/index.html.
154. Paula Tironi, Pharmaceutical Pricing: A Review of Proposals to Improve Access and
Affordability of Prescription Drugs, 19 ANNALS HEALTH L. 311, 324 (2010).
155. See Cost to Develop and Win Marketing Approval for a New Drug is $2.6 Billion, supra
note 84 (“Developing a new prescription medicine that gains marketing approval, a process
often lasting longer than a decade, is estimated to cost $2,558 million.”).
156. See Tironi, supra note 154.
157. Id.
158. Anderson, supra note 32.
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years, several prominent patents have expired, allowing increased
competition and falling profits.159 These patent expiries will cost the
industry an unprecedented $240 billion in the decade between 2010
and 2020.160
To offset costs and maximize profits, the pharmaceutical
industry promotes sales by spending a staggering amount of
money on advertising. Nine Big Pharma companies spend substantially more on sales and marketing than on R&D (Johnson &
Johnson, Novartis, Pfizer, Sanofi, Merck, GlaxoSmithKline, AstraZeneca, Eli Lilly, and AbbVie).161 While most other industries spend
an average of 10% of revenue on marketing, these Big Pharma
companies averaged over twice that with 23% in 2013.162 While
different business models call for varying proportions of marketing
expenditures, only the consumer packaged goods industry approaches this proportion.163 Spending a quarter of some of the most
substantial profits in the world on marketing is significant. By comparison, Big Pharma R&D expenditures averaged only 16% of
revenue.164 To note, Johnson & Johnson spent over twice as much
on marketing ($17.5 billion) as R&D ($8.2 billion).165 It is true that it
159. See id.
160. Richard Anderson, Pharmaceuticals Industry Facing Fundamental Change, BBC News

(Nov. 7, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/business-29659537.
161. Id.; see also Elizabeth Whitman, How the US Subsidizes Cheap Drugs for Europe, INT’L
BUS. TIMES (Sept. 24, 2015, 1:52 PM), http://www.ibtimes.com/how-us-subsidizes-cheap
-drugs-europe-2112662 (referencing Makovsky Instagram tweet indicating pharmaceutical
companies spend more on marketing than research).
162. See Anderson, supra note 32 (featuring data from which to calculate marketing
budget as a percent of revenue: Johnson & Johnson 25%, Novartis 25%, Pfizer 22%, Roche
18%, Sanofi 20%, Merck 22%, GSK 24%, AstraZeneca 28%, Eli Lilly 25%, AbbVie 23%); Sarah
Brady, What Percent of Revenue Do Publicly Traded Companies Spend on Marketing and Sales?,
VITAL, https://vtldesign.com/digital-marketing/content-marketing-strategy/percent-of-re
venue-spent-on-marketing-sales/ (last visited Apr. 7, 2018); Christine Moorman, Who Has
the Biggest Marketing Budgets?, FORBES (Mar. 5, 2014, 11:41 AM), https://www.forbes
.com/sites/christinemoorman/2014/03/05/who-has-the-biggest-marketing-budgets/#18a
8dc6a24 (“To put these figures in perspective, The CMO Survey reports that marketing
budgets represent approximately 10.9% of overall firm budgets.”).
163. Marketing Budgets Vary by Industry, WALL STREET J.: DELOITTE, http://deloitte
.wsj.com/cmo/2017/01/24/who-has-the-biggest-marketing-budgets.
164. See Anderson, supra note 32 (featuring data from which to calculate R&D budget
as a percent of revenue: Johnson & Johnson 12%, Novartis 17%, Pfizer 13%, Roche 18%,
Sanofi 14%, Merck 17%, GSK 13%, AstraZeneca 17%, Eli Lilly 24%, AbbVie 15%).
165. Id.; see also Kim T. Gordon, Defining Sales and Marketing, ENTREPRENEUR, https://
www.entrepreneur.com/article/46086 (last visited Apr. 7, 2018) (indicating sales and marketing expenses can include networking activities and advertisements).
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markets and sells more than just pharmaceuticals (medical devices,
household supplies, etc.). But considering that pharmaceuticalspecific advertising has grown more than any other advertising
category in the last four years, it is reasonable to assume Johnson &
Johnson has similarly focused its advertising expenses on its pharmaceutics.166 Last year the pharmaceutical industry spent $6 billion
in advertisements alone, mostly via television.167
This advertising may be not only exorbitant but also wasteful.
Notably, the United States and New Zealand are the only two
countries in the world to permit this type of product claims advertising.168 In 2015 the American Medical Association (AMA) called
for an outright ban of this direct-to-consumer advertising.169 The
organization argued that it “inflates demand” because inquisitive
patients, armed with a brand name and a sunny testimonial, arrive
at their prescriber appointments asking why they can’t have access
to these brand drugs.170 Yet, per the AMA, this deceptive consumertargeted advertising cannot correct the information asymmetries
inherent in the physician-patient relationship. As discussed in
section II.A.1, patients still lack the extensive medical training that
guides physicians’ prescription decisions. A quick television advertisement with “glossed-over” side effects cannot effectively
educate patients enough about price, quality, or alternative options
to make them truly informed consumers.171 Yet those prescribers
who do have the requisite education often feel pressured to prescribe the higher-priced drugs to please these patients, irrespective
of true need.172 Thus, they prescribe more of these medications than
is necessary. By providing just enough information to slightly offset

166. Bruce Horovitz & Julie Appleby, Prescription Drug Costs Are on the Rise; So Are
the TV Ads Promoting Them, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Mar. 20, 2017), http://khn.org/news
/prescription-drug-costs-are-on-the-rise-so-are-the-tv-ads-promoting-them; INT ’L TRADE
ADMIN., 2016 TOP MARKETS REPORT : MEDICAL DEVICES 2 (2016), http://www.trade.gov
/topmarkets/pdf/Medical_Devices_Executive_Summary.pdf (“The major U.S. medical
device companies include . . . Johnson & Johnson.”).
167. Horovitz & Appleby, supra note 166.
168. C. Lee Ventola, Direct-to-Consumer Pharmaceutical Advertising: Therapeutic or Toxic?,
36 PHARMACY & THERAPEUTICS 669, 669 (2011).
169. Horovitz & Appleby, supra note 166.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
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these information asymmetries, the advertising confuses the prescriber’s role in the patient-consumer’s decision. In the end, there is
little evidence to show that direct-to-consumer marketing provides
any real benefit to the patient.173
In all fairness, the required R&D expenditures are substantial in
this industry and provide many jobs that help the economy.
However, it is clear that Big Pharma’s investing in advertising and
promotion of the most expensive brand name drugs ultimately
drives up pharmaceutical sales and, thus, profits for the stockholders.174 And there may not be as many benefits to this advertising as the drug industry would like to claim.
C. High Prices and Low Returns Lead to Inaccessibility Problems
The skewed drug market often renders much-needed drugs
inaccessible. A 2010 article reports that twenty-nine percent of
adults reported neglecting to fill a prescription in the last two years
due to its impractical price.175 Twenty-three percent reported
cutting pills in half or skipping doses so their medications would
last longer.176 This type of behavior increased the rate of hospitalizations and ER visits.177 The prohibitive prices frustrate the
most cost-efficient care and result in wasted resources and unsafe
physical conditions.
At the same time, development of much-needed drugs is
ignored. Drug companies lack the incentives to spend resources
developing products that, while unprofitable, would treat neglected
conditions (Chagas disease, filarial disease, leishmaniasis, etc.)—

173. See S. Gilbody, P. Wilson & I. Watt, Benefits and Harms of Direct-to-Consumer
Advertising: A Systematic Review, 14 QUALITY & SAFETY HEALTH CARE 246, 246 (2005) (“Direct
to consumer advertising is associated with increased prescription of advertised products and
there is substantial impact on patients’ request for specific drugs and physicians’ confidence
in prescribing. No additional benefits in terms of health outcomes were demonstrated.”).
174. Id.
175. Tironi, supra note 154, at 317; see also Turner, supra note 56 (Kaiser Family
Foundation reports this number at 8% from 2004 to 2014); see also Cynthia Cox & Bradley
Sawyer, How Does Cost Affect Access to Care?, PETERSON-KAISER HEALTH SYS. TRACKER (Jan.
17, 2018), https://www.healthsystemtracker.org/chart-collection/cost-affect-access-care (reporting that in 2016 nineteen percent of adults in worse health decided to delay or forego
filling prescription drugs).
176. Tironi, supra note 154, at 317.
177. See id. at 322.
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both in the developing world and in the United States.178 The development of cures for any one of these diseases would not provide
the “blockbuster” dividend payouts that have become the specialty
of this industry.179 And public pressure to address these health
conditions is, alone, insufficient to override the entrenched profitmaximizing mindset.180 Consequently, drug companies have few
incentives to dedicate the funds needed for this R&D, leaving these
drugs undeveloped and the related health conditions untreated.181
In summary, without the normal, steadying free-market forces
in place, the mandate to maximize wealth leads to unfettered price
increases and mammoth profit-taking. While R&D expenses are
admittedly substantial, they do not justify the excessive profits
taken or marketing expenditures spent by drug companies.182
Ultimately, desperately needed drugs become impossibly expensive or otherwise inaccessible. Some form of regulation is needed
to manage the out-of-control gains and drug inaccessibility.
IV. PROPOSAL: APPLY A MODIFIED MLR REGULATION
TO THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY
To help right this abnormal market and curb unnecessary price
increases, the government should enact a value-focused pharmaceutical MLR regulation—patterned after the health insurance
MLR regulation. As explained in Part I, this regulation requires
insurers to rebate funds if they spend less than the designated
amount on value-enhancing activities, such as medical care.
If this regulation were to be applied to the pharmaceutical
industry, many of the same effects that have already been observed
in the insurance industry would also be observed here. First, it
would help right the abnormal market. Admittedly, this regulation
alone would not fix the information and control asymmetries in this
market, nor render transparent pricing more practical in every
situation. Neither would it turn the highly inelastic market more
elastic (by more closely linking demand to price). However, it

178. See Anderson, supra note 160. See generally DRUGS FOR NEGLECTED DISEASES
INITIATIVE, https://www.dndi.org/ (last visited Apr. 7, 2018).
179. See Anderson, supra note 29.
180. See id.
181. See id.
182. See Kolata, supra note 132.
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would likely improve transparency by compelling disclosure of the
aggregate amount spent in certain cost categories to demonstrate
compliance with the imposed ratio. And even if transparency is not
improved, this regulation would fill the role usually played by
price transparency in normal markets by providing a counterweight to the drug companies’ selling power by limiting their
potential profits and, thus, their prices. Even if elasticity—the link
between price and demand—is not improved, prices would be
constrained by this normalizing force (instead of rising unrestrainedly). Big Pharma would no longer charge “whatever they
want.” If Big Pharma did not reduce prices themselves to keep their
profits below the threshold, they would be compelled to rebate
the excess.
Second, this regulation would also address some of the challenges posed by the third-party insurer. Even though consumers
would still be shielded from the true costs of healthcare, the
regulation would put some limitation on sellers from implementing unchecked price hikes simply to maximize their own profits. In
this way, insurance companies could still play a continuous role
in mitigating the financial losses felt by any one individual, including those least able to pay, while also reducing the tension between supplier and buyer power so that it would not be as skewed
toward suppliers.
Third, this regulation could relieve some of the monopolistic
features of this industry. Patents could still provide some insurance
against the financial risk of research and development, but the
financial returns from the patents would have some type of a check.
Prices and profits could even normalize. Furthermore, this regulation might accomplish the goals of proposed government price
negotiations by, again, restraining seller power and checking
prices. The overall effect would be to improve the balance between
supplier and buyer power, thereby establishing price equilibrium.
While this market may never achieve normalcy, this measure could
correct it substantially.
Similar to the health insurance industry, MLR regulation would
provide some check on unlimited, exorbitant profits—currently an
impossible feat considering the heavy-handed seller power. Eventually, Big Pharma might stop placing so much emphasis on
unneeded expenditures, like wasteful advertising, since it wouldn’t
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be allowed to keep more than a certain percentage of the returns.
Also, similar to the health insurance industry, this regulation
would incentivize players to invest in value-promoting research
and development, and other improvements; it would also refine
efficiencies in less value-adding areas, like pharmacy benefit manager costs and profits. And finally, like in the insurance industry,
MLR regulation has the potential to cut billions of dollars in
American healthcare costs, potentially even shifting some of the
cost burden away from American taxpayers.
The adopted pharmaceutical ratio could mirror the health
insurance’s 80:20 ratio (80% medical loss and 20% other). But as
discussed above, expenditure ratios within the pharmaceutical
industry are dissimilar to any other industry (17% R&D, 23% sales
and marketing (S&M), 30% manufacturing, and 21% profits).183
Expecting a blanket 80:20 ratio in the drug industry therefore seems
unreasonable, if not drastic. Again, the purpose of the MLR regulation is not to impinge on financial viability but to impose guardrails
around expenditures to ensure a certain level of value for the
consumer. Erecting these guardrails requires designating each cost
category as either value-contributing or lesser-value-contributing;
analogizable to separating out the fat (or “other”) from the meat (or
medical loss). Under the ACA’s regulation, the insurance company’s value-contributing expenditures—denoted as medical loss—
include medical claims, quality improvement activities, taxes, and
licensing fees.184 Profits, administrative fees, marketing, agent
commissions, and community benefit expenditures constitute the
lesser-value-contributing, or “other,” category.185

183. See Deangelis, supra note 29, at 30 (“In 2013 the profit margin for pharmaceutical
companies ranged from 10% to 42%, with an average of 18%. Pfizer was at the top of the
profit list, and 4 other companies (Hoffman-La Roche, AbbVie, GlaxoSmithKline, and Eli
Lilly) had profit margins of more than 20%. As a point of reference, the profit margin of
pharmaceutical companies was essentially the same as that of banks, but the banks’ range of
profit was lower, from 5% to 29%.”); Adams, supra note 30 (“On average last year, the top 10
Big Pharmas spent just over 17% of their top line on research, with GlaxoSmithKline spending the second least in percentage terms at 12.9%, and the least in absolute numbers at £3.62
billion ($4.49 billion).”); Williams, supra note 7 (explaining pharmaceutical companies had
average profit margins of 19%).
184. See Explaining Health Care Reform: Medical Loss Ratio (MLR), supra note 26.
185. See PRIVATE HEALTH INSURANCE, supra note 18, at 4–5; Medical Loss Ratio,
HEALTHCARE.GOV, https://www.healthcare.gov/glossary/medical-loss-ratio-MLR/ (last
visited Apr. 7, 2018).
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In order to implement a similar regulation in the pharmaceutical industry, this industry’s major cost categories should be
evaluated for their value contribution, the inherent incentives
already at play, and the effect of this regulation on these incentives.
The rest of Part IV will examine each of the pharmaceutical
companies’ major cost categories for current incentives to limit or
increase expenditures. Each section will conclude with a recommendation regarding which side of the ratio (medical loss or
“other”) to assign each cost category. Ultimately, this Note recommends a 40:60 ratio for the pharmaceutical industry.
A. Profits Are “Other”
The pharmaceutical industry’s substantial profits can comfortably be assigned to the “other” category.186 Importantly, this does
not mean that drug companies should be bereft of profits. Profits
and incentives play an important role in the economy. The MLR
regulation simply puts guidelines around expenses to avoid unfair
extremes in profits and other administrative costs while requiring
value for consumers’ ever-increasing healthcare dollars.187 Value
returned to the consumer is the ultimate line between medical loss
and other expenses.188 Corporate profits provide relatively less, if
any, value to the consumer; consequently, they fall on the “other”
side of the MLR ratio.
B. Manufacturing and Distribution Are “Other”
Manufacturing and distribution costs, at times between 27% to
30% of Big Pharma’s revenue, make up the bulk of the value, or
“medical loss,” that is provided to drug consumers.189 The drugs
that are manufactured and distributed to consumers save lives, ease
suffering, and improve health. Considering that this constitutes the

186. See supra Part III.
187. “The 80/20 rule is ensuring that insurance companies provide consumers value

for their premium dollars.” The 80/20 Rule: Providing Value and Rebates to Millions of Customers,
CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., https://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Forms
-Reports-and-Other-Resources/mlr-rebates06212012a.html (last visited Apr. 7, 2018).
188. See id.
189. KIRCHHOFF, supra note 29; Basu et al., supra note 29, at 30 (“In the pharmaceutical
industry, costs attributed to manufacturing are a major part of a company’s total expenses.”).
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major value that Big Pharma provides, it might naturally fall on the
“medical loss” side of the ratio, similar to the insurance companies’
medical claims expense category. But this comparison is mostly
surface-level. Health insurance companies are mainly responsible
for the financial coverage of medical expenses—essentially a
transfer of funds. 190 But they are not involved in the actual delivery
of the medical care. In contrast, pharmaceutical companies are
responsible for the payment and the actual manufacturing and
distribution of the drugs themselves. Considering that there are
significantly more steps along the pharmaceutical supply chain
than for the payout of medical claims, and that drug companies
control more aspects of these expenses than do insurance
companies, these costs are more susceptible to potential abuse.191
And because the “medical loss” side determines the amount of
profits a Big Pharma company could keep, assigning manufacturing and distribution expenses to the “medical loss” side would
incentivize Big Pharma to inflate each step they controlled so as to
be able to keep additional profits.
In order to determine whether pharmaceutical manufacturing
and distribution costs should be considered “medical loss” or
“other,” this subsection will analyze (1) the significant control that
the drug industry has over this cost category, (2) the potential for
abuse of this power and the result of misaligning the incentives by
assigning manufacturing costs to the “medical loss” side of the
MLR ratio, and (3) possible solutions to correct this misalignment.
Analyzing these factors highlights the differences between the
insurance industry’s medical claims payouts and Big Pharma’s
manufacturing and distribution costs. The differences in control
and thus the potential for abuse of this cost category indicate that
manufacturing and distribution expenses should not be grouped
on the medical loss side of the ratio, since this could inflate that side
of the ratio and by extension inflate the “other” side of the ratio,
including profits. The analysis will conclude that this industry’s

190. What Is Health Insurance?, MED. NEWS TODAY , https://www.medicalnewstoday
.com/info/health-insurance (last updated Jan. 5, 2016).
191. Allen Jacques, 2017 Trends & Transformations in the Pharma Supply Chain, PHARMACEUTICAL PROCESSING (Dec. 29, 2016, 8:30 AM), https://www.pharmpro.com/article/2016
/12/2017-trends-transformations-pharma-supply-chain (“The pharmaceutical supply chain
is one of the most complex supply chains in the world.”).
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manufacturing and distribution costs should be categorized as
“other” to maintain the incentive to not inflate these costs in order
to keep more profits, but instead, run these processes efficiently.
1. Big Pharma exercises significant control over manufacturing and
distribution costs
Supply chains in the pharmaceutical industry are some of the
most complex in the world.192 For instance, drug production can
start overseas with ingredients arriving from various locations.193
For drugs entering the United States, the facilities and procedures
must meet the strict standards of both U.S. and international
regulators.194 In addition to regulatory complexity, the physical
process of getting drugs to consumers is itself no small feat. Once a
drug is manufactured, it is transported to numerous countries;
stored in warehouses; processed by distributors; and delivered to
retailers, hospitals, pharmacies, clinics, and so on until it eventually
arrives in the hands of the consumer.195 These supply chains are further complicated by sophisticated international contracts, intricate
distribution channels, business-to-business price negotiations, importation tariffs, labor regulations, equipment maintenance, pharmacy benefit managers, etc.196 There are many ways that Big
Pharma could manipulate their expenses so as to inflate their costs
and thus inflate the profit side of the ratio.
Although, emphasizing the pharmaceutical industry’s logistical
challenges is not meant to oversimplify the insurance industry.
192. Id.
193. See Basu et al., supra note 29, at 30–31.
194. Mike Benson, Pharmaceutical Industry Regulations, MKT. REALIST (Jan. 22, 2015,

11:06 AM), http://marketrealist.com/2015/01/pharmaceutical-industry-regulations.
195. Id.; see also THE HENRY J. KAISER FAM. FOUND., FOLLOW THE PILL: UNDERSTANDING
THE U.S. COMMERCIAL PHARMACEUTICAL SUPPLY CHAIN (2005), http://avalere.com/research
/docs/Follow_the_Pill.pdf.
196. IMS INST. FOR HEALTHCARE INFORMATICS, UNDERSTANDING THE PHARMACEUTICAL
VALUE CHAIN (2014), https://www.scribd.com/document/271050319/Understanding-Phar
maceutical-Value-Chain-pdf; Elaine M. Whittington, Types of Contracts, INST. FOR SUPPLY
MGMT. (1994), https://www.instituteforsupplymanagement.org/pubs/Proceedings/conf
proceedingsdetail.cfm?ItemNumber=5238&SSO=1; see Drafting Commercial Contracts for the
Pharmaceutical Industry, FALCONBURY, https://falconbury.co.uk/product/details/234/draft
ing-commercial-contracts-for-the-pharmaceutical-industry (last visited Apr. 7, 2018) (“In such
a highly regulated industry, understanding the key challenges of negotiation and drafting
an effective and watertight contract on an international level is a complex topic.”).
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Insurers’ hospital reimbursements are based predominantly on per
diem amounts or fee-for-service schedules, which must be negotiated annually between each hospital and insurer with their individual bargaining powers.197 Furthermore, insurance actuaries
must navigate market regulation and draw on historical experience
when developing rates.198 Insurance is complex to be sure.
However, the ability to inflate this expense category is different
in the pharmaceutical industry. While an insurer may dictate which
hospital or doctor is available to its enrollees, the insurer is not
on the hospitals’ administration team negotiating supply contracts,
running the nursing units, or managing doctors. Insurers are a
step removed from the management decision process.199 Drug
companies, however, exert significantly more control over their
major expenses. They directly oversee most of their products—
from negotiating research and development contracts, to running
manufacturing plants.200 Phrases like “integrate out global operations” or “reduce manufacturing costs” make good business sense
to the pharmaceutical industry but sound out of place when
applied to the insurance industry’s control over hospitals or
pharmacies.201 Insurance companies do not develop restructuring
plans for clinics or merge unprofitable hospitals. The differences in
each industry’s ability to control the largest portion of its costs has
critical ramifications—and deserves thoughtful consideration. Ultimately, this area is much more susceptible to abuse than the
regulated insurance claims payouts.

197. Uwe E. Reinhardt, How Do Hospitals Get Paid? A Primer, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 23, 2009,
6:40 AM), https://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/01/23/how-do-hospitals-get-paid
-a-primer.
198. Kurt Wrobel, Opinion, On Individual Health Insurance Reform, Actuarial Details
Matter, FORBES (Jan. 24, 2017, 12:19 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2017/01
/24/on-individual-health-insurance-reform-actuarial-details-matter/#1945846e62b1.
199. Sandhya Somashekhar & Ariana Eunjung Cha, Insurers Restricting Choice of Doctors
and Hospitals to Keep Costs Down, WASH. P OST (Nov. 20, 2013), http://wapo.st/17rq8bF?tid=
ss_mail&utm_term=.8d7e47dbc3a7 (“[I]nsurers are restricting their choice of doctors and
hospitals in order to keep costs low, and . . . many of the plans exclude top-rated hospitals. . . .
In most cases, the decision was about the cost of care.”).
200. Merck Closing 8 Plants, 8 Research Sites, CBS NEWS (July 8, 2010, 9:10 AM), https://
www.cbsnews.com/news/merck-closing-8-plants-8-research-sites.
201. Id.
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2. Manufacturing and distribution costs are susceptible to abuse by Big
Pharma, and thus, these costs would benefit from being grouped in the
“other”category
Because Big Pharma controls so much of the manufacturing and
distribution expenses, there is much more room for abuse. As such,
this cost category should be on the same side of the ratio as the
profits (the “other” side). This way, these expenses would cut into
the profit allowance, as they do now. If these expenses were on the
“other” side, the incentive would continue to be to run an efficient
supply chain, thus minimizing expenditures instead of building
them up.202 Currently, companies cut manufacturing expenditures
because it saves them money.203 Profit maximization—and few
other strong forces—usually impose maximum limits on labor
costs, ingredients, or other manufacturing expenses.204 Therefore, it
is possible that assigning this category to the medical loss side of
the ratio would eliminate the only incentive to run an efficient
supply chain.
Assigning manufacturing and distribution expenses to the
medical loss side will, in fact, weaken or remove the companies’
incentive to minimize these expenses. Again, the MLR regulation
would require a company to limit its profits and “other” expenses
to a certain ratio based on the “medical loss.” If the “other”
expenses, including profits, exceeded an amount that was proportionate to the “medical loss” or value provided to the consumer,
then the company would be required to refund the excess back to
the consumer. Therefore, a Big Pharma CEO seeking to increase her
allowable profits could simply increase her medical loss side, such
as workers’ salaries or the amount of ingredients purchased. That
way, as the value (“medical loss”) side of the ratio grows, so does
the lesser-value (“other”) side, including profits. And considering

202. Tuan Nguyen, 6 Ways to Get Smart and Cut Manufacturing Costs, MANUFACTURING
TRANSFORMATION (Jan. 21, 2014), http://www.apriso.com/blog/2014/01/6-ways-to-get
-smart-and-cut-manufacturing-costs (suggesting that manufacturing intelligence solutions
“can help executives better manage their manufacturing assets in a way that meets customer
demand and might actually also help a company to save some money”).
203. See Merck Closing 8 Plants, 8 Research Sites, supra note 200 (“Those cuts are intended
to save the Whitehouse Station, N.J., company about $3.5 billion a year starting in 2012.
Merck said Thursday the restructuring plans announced so far will bring savings of about
$2.7 billion to $3.1 billion in 2012, most of its target.”).
204. See Nguyen, supra note 202.
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all the control that drug companies have over distribution, and all
the middlemen and contracts in this supply chain, there is ample
opportunity to drive manufacturing and distribution costs up—an
opportunity largely unavailable to health insurers whose medical
claims payouts are heavily regulated. This heavy claim regulation
limits what hospitals and doctors can collect and, therefore, limits
the medical claims paid out by insurance companies, which therefore limits the insurance companies’ eligible profits. However,
there is little regulation to limit what drug companies can pay out
for the ingredients or labor required to manufacture and distribute
medication. And if drug companies voluntarily shrink their manufacturing and distribution costs, they also shrink their allowable
profits. Thus, by assigning this cost category to the “medical loss”
side, pharmaceutical companies would lose the incentive to run
factories and supply chains efficiently.
The reality of this problem is readily illustrated by analogy to
the current U.S. healthcare spending crisis, which was caused in
large part by the way hospitals were historically paid: the cost-plus
payment model. 205 The cost-plus payment structure reimbursed
hospitals for the cost of care they provided plus a certain percentage
on top.206 As a result, by 1980 hospitals had lost the incentive to
minimize costs.207 Hospital management groups, looking to earn
bigger profits, manipulated reimbursements by simply inflating
their expenditures.208 Drug companies could easily make parallel
moves if such a system were adopted. For instance, if manufacturing and distribution costs are counted as medical loss, then
wasting batches of medications and charging excessive fees by
205. Elizabeth Teisberg, Michael E. Porter & Gregory B. Brown, Making Competition
Work in Healthcare, HARV. BUS. REV. (July–Aug. 1994), https://hbr.org/1994/07/making
-competition-in-health-care-work (“Beginning in the post-World War II period, hospitals were
reimbursed on a cost-plus basis, which in turn produced rapidly escalating hospital costs.”).
206. RICHARD E. MCDERMOTT & KEVIN D. STOCKS, CODE BLUE 61 (3d ed. 2002) (“Before
1984, most insurance plans paid hospitals their billed charges less a nominal discount.
Medicare and many Medicaid plans paid cost-plus. Hospitals were reimbursed actual costs,
plus a markup for profit.”).
207. LINDA GORMAN, THE HISTORY OF HEALTH CARE COSTS AND HEALTH INSURANCE 9
(2006), https://www.westandfirm.org/docs/Gorman-01.pdf (“The three reimbursement
methods used by the [Blue Cross Organizations] did not create normal business incentives.
They assumed that all hospital costs should be paid whether or not they were generated by
an inefficient organization. For the nonprofit [Blue Cross Organizations], a reduction in costs
reduced the amount of revenue collected.”).
208. See id.
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pharmacy benefit management companies could become real
investment strategies for the pharmaceutical industry—especially
if such budget increases could justify expansion of the marketing
budget to sell more drugs and make more profits.
However, the analogy to the cost-plus payment model is imperfect, and any problems created by categorizing manufacturing and
distribution costs as medical loss may be offset by potential
benefits. Indeed, creating incentives to inflate costs might result in
pharmaceutical cost-increasing measures that are actually procompetitive. Hypothetically, drug production could immigrate to
more expensive areas like the United States, resulting in job
creation and economic stimulation. If this MLR regulation ends up
mirroring the cost-plus payment model by placing this cost
category on the “medical loss” side and thus flipping the current
incentive to cut costs and maximize profits, it would drive up
manufacturing costs—in effect robbing the consumer of the very
value the MLR regulation tries to ensure.
One of the biggest differences between enacting an MLR
regulation and the cost-plus payment model is that, unlike the
blank check of “plus” returns that the government promised
hospitals, pharmaceutical companies would not be guaranteed a
“plus” or margin. In other words, they would not get a guaranteed
check for every expense; rather, this MLR regulation proposal
guarantees only that drug companies could keep a limited amount
of their profits that they have garnered themselves, in proportion
with their medical loss expenses. Consequently, pharmaceutical
companies would still have to organize their expenses to remain
financially solvent. Similarly, health insurers under the MLR
regulation have not received a blank check for all their expenses.
Like the health insurers who fled the “money-losing” individual
marketplace for more profitable services, Big Pharma would likely
shed any money-draining manufacturing and distribution processes in favor of the ones that can turn a profit. 209 They would
never choose to spend so much in manufacturing and distribution
that they would lose money overall. But at the same time, these
companies could still spend a little extra on one supply contract,
pay their distributors a little more in one area, and everything

209. See Sommer, supra note 23.
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would add up to increase their expenses (and thus their allowable
profits) without draining their coffers. Again, drug companies exert
much more control over this expense category, and there is ample
room to drive up costs enough to balloon their profits right where
they want them.
In sum, the decision of which side to assign manufacturing and
distribution costs comes down to how much power drug companies have over their costs and reimbursement rates and, therefore,
the potential for abuse. The drug companies’ control over costs deserves additional study. Although, given reported 17% annual
price hikes, it seems drug companies exert at least some significant
control over their reimbursements. But outside forces also play a
role in influencing rates. Exactly what the balance is between all
these forces remains to be determined, but it is clear that Big
Pharma has significant control over this cost category, and any new
incentives should limit the probable abuse. Regardless, categorizing manufacturing and distribution expenses as “medical loss”
does nothing to reduce the country’s overall healthcare costs—a
main goal of this proposal.
3. Alternative options to align incentives
If manufacturing and distribution costs are categorized as
medical loss, other regulatory measures could help to keep drug
prices within a manageable range. That is, some value-enhancing
measures could limit the drug companies’ ability to increase
manufacturing costs for the sole purpose of growing the medical
loss side of the equation and, by extension, profit eligibility.
Clearly, infusing price transparency and other free market forces
into this industry to manage drug prices should be a priority. But
for the reasons enumerated above, this is not always possible.210
Incentivizing reduction of manufacturing and distributions costs
would help correct the market where price transparency and other
normal market forces could not be achieved.

210. See supra Section II.A.2.
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Price regulation is one proven method of controlling costs.211
This type of regulation could prevent the unnecessary ratcheting
up of manufacturing and supply-chain costs. Moreover, if an MLR
regulation were enacted, it is likely that companies would be less
inclined to fight against such price controls since profits would be
more constricted regardless. Price controls or other guidelines surrounding production expenses could allow manufacturing and
distribution costs to stay on the medical loss side of the ratio while
still ensuring value. And evidence suggests that a reduction in
production costs will increase expenses in R&D—a potential
double win.212
There are, however, potential issues with adopting traditional
price controls. These include (1) pushing prices so far below natural levels that talent and investor capital leave the market, (2) the
inability of fixed prices to respond to changes in markets or costs,
(3) the risk that lengthy political discussions or formulas adjusted
per the bias of an agency would cause implementation delays of the
set prices, (4) possible excess supply or demand that the market
itself cannot correct, and (5) perverse incentives such as quality
reduction by those looking to cut costs.213 Given these issues,
traditional price controls are probably not the answer to preventing
abuse in the manufacturing cost category.
Alternative options could counteract some of these cost-raising
incentives. One option is to borrow again from the ACA’s MLR
regulation and mandate public reporting of cost hikes of ten
percent or more in this category.214 Setting a cap for these hikes is

211. France has seen the growth in its medication costs slow (2.1% in 2008, 2% in 2009,
1.1% in 2010) due to reduced reimbursements and regulated price reductions. Annie Fenina
et al., Les Comptes Nationaux de la Santé en 2010, ÉTUDES ET RESULTATS, Sept. 2011, at 1,
http://drees.social-sante.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/er773-2.pdf.
212. See Basu et al., supra note 29.
213. Fiona M. Scott Morton, The Problems of Price Controls, 24 REGULATION 50, 50–
51 (2001).
214. See PRIVATE HEALTH INSURANCE, supra note 18 (indicating an insurance carrier
must publicly explain premium rate increases at rates of 10% or more through rate review);
Fighting Unreasonable Health Insurance Premium Increases, CTRS. FOR MEDICAID & MEDICARE
SERVS., https://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Fact-Sheets-and-FAQs/ratereview05192
011 a.html (last visited Apr. 7, 2018) (“Under the final regulation: Starting September 1, 2011,
insurers seeking rate increases of 10 percent or more for non-grandfathered plans in the
individual and small group markets are required to publicly disclose the proposed increases

253

5.SCHIEL_FIN_NOHEADER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

8/17/18 10:42 AM

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

2018

another option. Alternatively, government oversight could be increased to ensure fair valuation. Capping aggregated reimbursements (think capitated payments) would mean that intentional
waste (e.g., batches of faulty medicine, unnecessary contract raises)
would still cut into a pharmaceutical company’s profits and hopefully minimize this unwanted behavior. It is also possible that
competing players could provide the needed competition to keep
pharmaceutical manufacturers running lean, such as Intermountain Healthcare’s upcoming nonprofit generic drug company.215 Yet
it is unlikely that even this type of competition would help reduce
prices of patented, brand-name drugs.216
Moving manufacturing and distribution expenses to the
“other” side of the MLR ratio might be the best way to incentivize
reducing waste. If manufacturing were to be lumped with “other”
expenses, then those costs would cut into profits—and Big
Pharma’s incentives would be aligned with reducing waste—just
like they do currently. Big Pharma CEOs would squeeze everything
on that side of the ratio to expand the profits section as much as
possible. It would encourage efficiency in manufacturing, as do
current market forces. This would also eliminate much of the
arbitrariness associated with traditional price controls while still
restricting prices to accentuate value. Instead of depending on price
regulation based on lagging or even random data, prices could
fluctuate naturally with expenses and innovation while still leaving
a reasonable profit margin. Logically, the “other” section should be
expanded to include manufacturing expenses.
4. Manufacturing and distribution expenses should be classified
as “other”
Manufacturing and distribution expenses should be on the
“other” side of the Medical Loss Ratio. Admittedly, this category

and the justification for them. Such increases will be reviewed by either State or Federal
experts to determine whether they are unreasonable.”).
215. Reed Abelson & Katie Thomas, Fed Up with Drug Companies, Hospitals Decide to
Start Their Own, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 18, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/18/health
/drug-prices-hospitals.html.
216. Beth Jones Sanborn, Intermountain-Led Generic Drug Venture Faces Big Hurdles,
Could Forge New Regulatory and Political Ground, HEALTHCARE FINANCE (Mar. 15, 2018),
http://www.healthcarefinancenews.com/news/intermountain-led-generic-drug-venture
-faces-big-hurdles-could-forge-new-regulatory-and.
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provides value to the consumer in that this category actually
produces and delivers the life-changing or life-enhancing drugs to
the consumer. And the costs are substantial—like insurance
payouts. But assigning manufacturing and distribution expenses to
the “other” side would be the best insurance against abuse and
provide the most value to the consumer. Furthermore, like the
health insurance industry, Big Pharma does not have a guaranteed
“cost-plus” profit in proportion to manufacturing expenditures.
The reimbursements would not be automatic the way they were for
hospitals under the cost-plus payment model. As a final note, when
calculating the rebates, it will be important to exclude any
manufacturing expenses from Big Pharma’s non-pharmaceutical
areas (household goods, information management arms, etc.) from
the manufacturing and distribution directly related to drugs. In
conclusion, the manufacturing and distribution category is
valuable medical loss. Yet, given the incentives that would result if
this were assigned to the “medical loss” side of the ratio, more
value is preserved if this category is assigned to the “other” side of
the ratio. Further inquiry and careful analysis in this area are
strongly urged.
C. Lawsuits Are “Medical Loss”
Under the insurance MLR regulation, the medical loss side is
adjusted by certain funds set aside as reserves.217 One allotment of
reserve money is specifically for potential future lawsuits.218 These
funds are counted as part of the medical loss, per the National Association of Insurance Commissioners’ (NAIC) and Department of
Health and Human Services’ (HHS) recommendations.219 Although
this “value” designation could incentivize Big Pharma to open
themselves up for lawsuits, lawsuit reserves should be allocated to
the medical loss side, given the realities of this industry and
pending different recommendations from HHS.

217. See KIRCHHOFF, supra note 29.
218. See id.
219. See id.
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D. Research and Development Is “Medical Loss”
Drug companies’ constant refrain is, essentially, “only an attractive return on investment will entice the capital necessary to fund
world-changing breakthroughs.”220 Indeed, capital is funneled into
the drug industry, at least in part, because of the substantial
financial returns.221 And to be sure, pharmaceutical breakthroughs
are medical loss. Developments in this area mean people live longer
and healthier lives, sometimes with fewer medical costs.222 In fact,
the resulting discoveries from all that American capital differentiate this country’s drug innovation from that of others.223
American pharmaceutical innovation is second to none. If R&D
were further incentivized under an MLR regulation, Big Pharma
might even turn additional attention to unprofitable, but badly
needed, neglected drugs. Thus, promoting the value inherent in
this category is vital.
Yet theoretically, there is still room for abuse. Drug companies
could certainly throw money into research for the sake of increasing
this side of the ratio without any real advancements. Currently,
annual projected Big Pharma R&D returns on investment are down

220. See Lydia Ramsey, Pharma Companies’ No. 1 Justification for High Drug Prices Is
Bogus, BUS. INSIDER (Dec. 9, 2015, 12:53 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/research
-and-development-costs-might-not-factor-into-drug-pricing-2015-12 (“Pharmaceutical companies often cite the cost of researching and developing new compounds as the reason for
their high drug prices.”); Williams, supra note 7.
221. See Williams, supra note 7.
222. The Value of Medical Innovation: An Overview, HEALTHCARE INST. N.J. (last updated
Aug. 29, 2017), http://hinj.org/value-of-medical-innovation (“Globally, between 1960 and
1997, new therapies accounted for 45 percent of the increase in life expectancy in 30
developing and high-income countries. . . . New therapies have contributed to a nearly
22 percent decline in cancer deaths since the 1990s. U.S. cancer survivorship alone has more
than tripled since 1970, with nearly 14.5 million cancer survivors alive in the country last
year. . . . The HIV/AIDS death rate has dropped nearly 85 percent since the introduction of
highly active antiretroviral treatment (HAART) in 1995.”).
223. Elizabeth Whitman, How the U.S. Subsidizes Cheap Drugs for Europe, INT’L BUS.
TIMES (Sept. 24, 2015, 1:52 PM), http://www.ibtimes.com/how-us-subsidizes-cheap-drugs
-europe-2112662 (“The U.S. accounted for 46 percent of global life sciences research and
development—the vast majority of which is in biopharmaceuticals—according to the
December 2013 issue of R&D Magazine. ‘The U.S. is the global leader in biomedical
innovation,’ Mark Grayson, a spokesman for PhRMA, a pharmaceutical industry trade
group that represents many of the world’s biggest drug companies, said in an email.”).
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to 3.2%.224 An MLR regulation might, in practice, encourage waste
in research funds. Big Pharma could find a myriad of ways to prop
up these expenses. For example, more drugs might begin to
perform overlapping functions without real differentiated value
from each other—with their development costs all ascribed to
“R&D.” Production costs might shift even more to the expensive
American labor force.225 Big Pharma could push for greater FDA
scrutiny to rack up costs in this category. And drug companies
could purposefully keep drugs in the development stage longer.
For these reasons R&D, like manufacturing costs, might belong on
the “other” side.
However, R&D ultimately belongs with the medical loss.
Again, unlike in the cost-plus payment model, there would be a
check on these expenditures—the need to maintain a profit. Not all
research leads to substantial discoveries, so there is no guaranteed
return in this investment area. Furthermore, a drug cannot begin to
return a profit until it has passed the FDA gate.226 Thus, drug
companies would still push for minimal, not more, costly FDA
intervention. Stockholder considerations, pressure for substantial
breakthroughs, and public perception would all encourage efficient
R&D. And importantly, this might incentivize development of neglected drugs that otherwise would not return a profit. With the
value and controls inherent in this category, R&D should ultimately stay on the medical loss side.

224. A New Future for R&D? Measuring the Return from Pharmaceutical Innovation 2017,
DELOITTE, https://www2.deloitte.com/uk/en/pages/life-sciences-and-healthcare/articles
/measuring-return-from-pharmaceutical-innovation.html (last visited Apr. 7, 2018).
225. Vanessa Fuhrmans & Scott Hensley, Drug Makers Are More Vocal Against Europe’s
Price Controls, WALL STREET J. (Dec. 13, 2001), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1008191144
635615520.
226. See Development & Approval Process (Drugs), U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://
www.fda.gov/drugs/developmentapprovalprocess/ (last updated Jan. 16, 2018) (“American
consumers benefit from having access to the safest and most advanced pharmaceutical
system in the world. The main consumer watchdog in this system is FDA’s Center for Drug
Evaluation and Research (CDER). The center’s best-known job is to evaluate new drugs
before they can be sold. CDER’s evaluation not only prevents quackery, but also provides
doctors and patients the information they need to use medicines wisely. The center ensures
that drugs, both brand-name and generic, work correctly and that their health benefits
outweigh their known risks.”).
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E. Taxes, Fees, and Depreciation Are “Medical Loss”
In insurance MLR regulation, taxes, as well as regulatory or
licensing fees, are considered medical loss.227 However, federal
income taxes on investment income and capital gains (profit from
a sale or investment) are not.228 Here, taxes and fees are similarly
set by outside forces, such as government regulations.229 As a result,
penalizing companies for paying these costs does not make sense.
Furthermore, it is unlikely that Big Pharma will advocate for an
increased tax rate. The incentives are already sufficient to keep
these costs low; no artificial incentives are required. Depreciation
of property and other assets can be calculated using various
methods.230 Some uniform way of measuring this should be established to prevent one drug company from obtaining an unfair
advantage over the others. These categories can all be grouped
similarly to their counterparts in the insurance industry on the
medical loss side.
F. Marketing Is “Other”
This subsection argues that although advertising drug information does result in valuable informed consumerism, assigning
marketing to the medical loss side of the MLR ratio creates perverse
incentives for drug companies. In general, the staggering financial
returns from marketing investment are too high for drug companies not to want to flood this category with cash. The incentives
would be especially counterproductive because the greater their
profit allowance grows, the more they would spend on advertising.
Instead, marketing should be categorized as “other,” thereby incentivizing drug companies to minimize marketing expenses.

227. See Explaining Health Care Reform: Medical Loss Ratio (MLR), supra note 26.
228. See id.
229. Topic Number: 409—Capital Gains and Losses, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/taxtopics

/tc409 (last updated Mar. 13, 2018).
230. Ben McClure, An Introduction to Depreciation, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.invest
opedia.com/articles/fundamental/04/090804.asp (last visited Apr. 7, 2018).
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1. Promoting awareness of medications is valuable
Valid arguments suggest that marketing should be categorized
as medical loss. In an era of increased transparency, consumers
want to be empowered and educated about drugs.231 They want to
sit down with their physicians and have informed conversations.232
But if physicians are unaware of a particular drug, they will not
prescribe it and patients cannot gain access to it. Thus, promoting
awareness of beneficial treatments through marketing is valuable.233 Furthermore, there is merit to the drug makers’ claim that
unless they see attractive profits, investments in R&D will drop.
And the best way to turn a profit is to advertise the product.234
Moreover, informal controls play a minimal role in reducing
marketing expenses, supporting the position that they should be
considered medical loss. Consumers along both party lines advocate for reductions in drug prices, while the media publicizes the
excesses.235 Additionally, the pot of revenue is somewhat finite, and
marketing funds have to come from somewhere. Furthermore, if
the MLR regulation is enacted and profits are limited to a reasonable rate, there may not be the same pressure to engage in profit-

231. NAT’L CTR. FOR BIOTECHNOLOGY INFO., THE HEALTHCARE IMPERATIVE: LOWERING
COSTS AND IMPROVING OUTCOMES: WORKSHOP SERIES SUMMARY (2010), https://www.ncbi
.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK53921.
232. See Horovitz & Appleby, supra note 166 (“Reis said her mother did take the Lyrica
‘and it’s helped.’ That’s a good thing, says the brand guru who takes pride in looking out for
her mom. ‘The ad spurred the conversation.’”).
233. Russell Huebsch, What Are the Benefits of Direct-to-Consumer Advertising?, HEARST
NEWSPAPERS, http://smallbusiness.chron.com/benefits-direct-to-consumer-advertising-3587
.html (last visited Apr. 7, 2018) (“The 2004 study showed that DTCA ads were especially
helpful in getting low-income families to seek medical care. Low-income individuals and families are typically the hardest demographic to reach for any public awareness campaign.”).
234. Robert Pear, Marketing Tied to Increase in Prescription Drug Sales, N.Y. TIMES (Sept.
20, 2000), https://www.nytimes.com/2000/09/20/us/marketing-tied-to-increase-in-prescrip
tion-drug-sales.html (‘‘Sales of these drugs contributed powerfully to the steep increase in
prescription drug spending in 1999.’’).
235. Mary Ellen McIntire, Republicans Eye Boosting Competition to Help Trump Lower
Drug Prices, MORNING CONSULT (Dec. 9, 2016), https://morningconsult.com/2016/12/09
/republicans-eye-boosting-competition-help-trump-lower-drug-prices (“President-elect
Donald Trump says he wants to lower drug prices, an idea that’s been pushed primarily by
Democrats but has support from some key GOP senators.”); Petersen, supra note 8 (“The
companies raised prices—not to fund research to discover new drugs—but to boost profits
for executives and investors.”); Ransdell Pierson & Bill Berkrot, Democrats Take Aim at Drug
Prices, Prompting Sharp Drops in Biotech Stocks, REUTERS (Sept. 28, 2015, 6:30 PM), http://
www.reuters.com/article/us-valeant-pharms-congress/democrats-take-aim-at-drug-prices
-prompting-sharp-drops-in-biotech-stocks-idUSKCN0RS28N20150929.
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maximizing marketing. Enacting the MLR regulation could naturally reduce these expenses. However, despite these potential
benefits, other concerns suggest marketing should be assigned to
the “other” side.
2. Marketing should be classified as “other” to align incentives
Linking increased marketing expenses to increased profits by
putting marketing on the medical loss side of the ratio would only
exacerbate current problems. A Big Pharma CEO faced with managing huge profit cuts would start looking at her levers. The last
thing she would do is pull the lever that shrinks the “other” side of
the ratio—her allowed profits—any more than she absolutely must.
If her marketing expenditures are considered medical loss, then she
would be prone to ratchet them up. Unlike the individual marketplace, advertising is not “money losing.” The return on advertising
investment is substantial. If these expenditures started producing
profits that exceeded the imposed ratio threshold, the CEO would
find a legitimate channel for those extra funds. Most likely she
would move them into R&D. But it is highly improbable that she
would voluntarily reduce any medical-loss-qualifying expenditures because that would cut her overall allowable profit amount—
which she’s already losing. Instead, she would likely continue to
channel funds into potentially wasteful marketing expenses that
would continue to dwarf the R&D expenditures, effectively robbing value from consumers. The effects would be almost identical
to the effects of the cost-plus payment model: The more the CEO
spends on marketing, the more profits she is guaranteed. Overall,
drug prices would not drop as desired if marketing expenses were
considered to be medical loss.
Instead, categorizing marketing costs as “other” would incentivize minimizing advertising expenditures while still spending
enough to attract a profit. This Note does not propose slashing
marketing to cram it with profits into a twenty percent limit. However, categorizing marketing as “other” effectively incentivizes
waste reduction in this area. It could significantly reduce direct-toconsumer advertising without outright banning it. This type of
advertising could drop to a reasonable level, which would result in
less pressure on physicians from advertisement-prepped patients
to prescribe unnecessary treatment. Since there is such an influ260
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ential return on marketing investment, the only genuine outside
force on marketing expenditures is its detraction from profits.236
Removing this link would seriously frustrate the effort to reduce
unnecessary marketing and its associated waste. It is therefore imperative that these expenditures be condensed. Marketing belongs
on the “other” side of the MLR ratio.
G. Community Benefit Expenditures Are “Medical Loss”
In some ways, public health education campaigns and other
community benefit expenditures are like marketing. They increase
awareness of a product and promote sales.237 Consequently, some
might argue that such expenditures are no better than advertising;
they are just pharmaceutical propaganda for drugs. However, the
material can provide substantial value to the public—similar to the
value noted above in the marketing section (IV.F).238 Given the
material’s similar nature to advertising, it would make sense to
combine this with marketing. But as long as community benefit
expenditures are defined narrowly as educational initiatives—as
they are in the health insurance ratio regulation—and exclude
purely promotional initiatives, this can be medical loss.
H. Salaries and Agent Commissions Are “Other”
The purpose of a for-profit business is to make a profit.239 Larger
profits thus equate to more success. Competitive salespersons’ and
agents’ salaries, along with attractive commissions, are critical to
effectively managing resources and creating this profit.240 In
236. See Pear, supra note 234.
237. See Public Health Campaigns that Change Minds, MILKEN INST. SCH. PUB. HEALTH

(Nov. 8, 2016), https://publichealthonline.gwu.edu/blog/health-communication-campaigns/
(“How do you motivate an individual to quit smoking? Persuade a community to vaccinate
their children? Incentivize a whole nation to eat better? These types of questions are at the
heart of every health communication campaign, which aim to change how people think
about their health and simultaneously provide them with the resources and incentives to
improve it.”).
238. See id.
239. See Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 70 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919) (discussing the
shareholder primacy norm).
240. DAVID A. BJORK, HEALTHCARE EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION: A GUIDE FOR LEADERS
AND TRUSTEES 3 (2012) (“Hospitals may be tax-exempt charities serving the public good, but
they are still big, complicated businesses with narrow profit margins, and they need talented
executives to keep them strong. Tax exemption and public funding for Medicare and
Medicaid have no bearing on what it costs to recruit and retain executives.”).

261

5.SCHIEL_FIN_NOHEADER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

8/17/18 10:42 AM

2018

general, salary incentives produce results. Thus, both outside and
inside forces urge maximizing this category. Ultimately, salaries,
including those of pharmacy benefit managers, should be expansive enough to attract talent but contained enough to encourage
efficiency (while avoiding extreme profit-taking). Salaries should
fall on the “other” side.
I. Administrative Expenses Are “Other”
The administrative expenses category contemplates office
expenses such as rent, utilities, supplies, and administrative personnel. These expenses provide relatively little value to the drug
consumer. Therefore, encouraging efficiency, quality, and thrift is
important here. In order to minimize waste in this area, administrative costs should be categorized as “other” and left out of the
medical loss category.
J. Exceptions to Consider
There are exceptions to the 80:20 rule in the health insurance
industry for a reason.241 Similarly, some pharmaceutical companies
do not follow the standard Big Pharma model. Some companies
lack the funds or infrastructure for major R&D.242 Others require
only a modest marketing budget. Exceptions should be made per
the various business models. There should be room for some
reasonable flexibility.
K. Ratio Should Be 40:60
Imposing an overall MLR ratio, like the 80:20 ratio in the
insurance industry, could reduce drug prices while reserving to
pharmaceutical companies control over pricing and budget details.
With a similar overall ratio, these companies would have the
flexibility to choose to spend more on advertising and keep less for

241. See Explaining Health Care Reform: Medical Loss Ratio (MLR), supra note 26. For other
insurance designs, the ratio is flexible so as to facilitate financial viability. See id. For example,
Special Circumstances Adjustments apply to newer plans, min-med plans, and expatriate
plans to address individual insurance situations. Low-enrollment insurers are similarly held
to different ratios to adjust for less predictability in claims expenses. Alternatively, if employers wish to self-insure and avoid paying the “non-value” margins to an insurance
company, they are not subject to the MLR regulation requirement. See id.
242. See id.
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profits, or vice versa. However, as described above, pharmaceutical
companies have greater power to increase the costs of production.
Thus, a mixed ratio might better achieve the main goal of targeting
value. A specific profit percentage cap, such as 12% (the next highest industry’s average profits), combined with an overall medical
loss ratio like 70:30, could provide a helpful general framework,
leaving Big Pharma flexibility over the details.
Again, Big Pharma currently averages 21% in profits.243 A 12%
profit margin seems reasonable and competitive. After adding sales
and marketing (currently 23%; ideally, it should match other industries’ 10% average), manufacturing and distribution costs (30%),
as well as administrative costs, salaries and commissions, etc., the
“other” portion of the ratio could approach 60%, which would
leave 40% for medical loss. Similar to what has happened to the
insurance industry, Big Pharma has the potential to rebate billions
of dollars back to Americans, easing the increases in prescription
prices.244 Players in the pharmaceutical industry might even tighten
their belts and squeeze out costs that don’t add value to consumers—all while making a reasonable margin of profit—just like
insurers. Admittedly, this ratio would benefit from a more detailed
economic analysis that could arrive at a more calculated ratio,
adjustable as the market fluctuates.
V. CONCLUSION: REDUCED TAXPAYER BURDEN,
INCREASED AFFORDABILITY
Where should the refunds go when pharmaceutical profits
exceed the 12% cap, or if the “other” category oversteps 60%? The
health insurance industry rebates their excess to individuals and
corporations.245 Yet for pharmaceutical companies without easily
accessible means to rebate consumers, issuing rebates to individuals and corporations likely would be too complicated and
burdensome. However, there is another potential way to channel
these funds to lower insurance premiums (which is perhaps a more
243. See Williams, supra note 7.
244. See PRIVATE HEALTH INSURANCE, supra note 18.
245. See The 80/20 Rule: Providing Value and Rebates to Millions of Customers, supra note

187 (“The 80/20 rule is ensuring that insurance companies provide consumers value for their
premium dollars.”).
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widespread pain point worth addressing). At first, the government
could collect and distribute this money to reimburse the stillunfunded ACA risk corridors that were intended to be operational
in the initial years of the ACA’s implementation.246 This would
relieve taxpayers of their $8 billion debt still owed to insurance
companies.247 After that bill is paid, the funds could then be
distributed evenly to insurers on an ongoing basis in a way that
extends the ACA’s reinsurance payments and spreads out savings
to the consumers.248 Since insurance companies have their own
value-driving MLR, premium price growth could slow and—dare
we hope—slightly reverse. This type of regulation could defray
individual and family healthcare expenditures, increasing affordability for all. If this result is unpalatable then these funds could be
channeled toward other worthwhile endeavors—such as funding
nursing or doctor scholarships or helping provide insurance for
those with disabilities.
This proposal might have other advantages as well. Big Pharma
might move drug production jobs to the United States in an attempt
to lever up production costs and thus their profit eligibility. Drug
companies might finally shift the R&D cost burden from the United
States by lowering prices in America while keeping prices abroad
fixed.249 Some may argue that markets eventually find ways around

246. See Livingston, supra note 37.
247. See id.
248. See Cynthia Cox, Ashley Semanskee, Gary Claxton & Larry Levitt, Explaining

Health Care Reform: Risk Adjustment, Reinsurance, and Risk Corridors, HENRY J. KAISER FAM.
FOUND . 6 (2016), http://www.kff.org/health-reform/issue-brief/explaining-health-care-re
form-risk-adjustment-reinsurance-and-risk-corridors (“Reinsurance differs from risk adjustment in that reinsurance is meant to stabilize premiums by reducing the incentive for
insurers to charge higher premiums due to concerns about higher-risk people enrolling early
in the program, whereas risk adjustment is meant to stabilize premiums by mitigating the
effects of risk selection across plans. Thus, reinsurance payments are only made to individual
market plans that are subject to new market rules (e.g., guaranteed issue), whereas risk
adjustment payments are made to both individual and small group plans. Additionally,
reinsurance payments are based on actual costs, whereas risk adjustment payments are
based on expected costs. As reinsurance is based on actual rather than predicted costs,
reinsurance payments will also account for low-risk individuals who may have unexpectedly
high costs (such as costs incurred due to an accident or sudden onset of an illness). . . .
[R]einsurance payments represent a net flow of dollars into the individual market, in effect
subsidizing premiums in that market.”).
249. See Mc Govern, supra note 67 (“[T]he European Federation of Pharmaceutical
Industries and Associations released a report on the pharmaceutical industry. In this report,
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this type of price regulation with reduced efficiencies and
quality.250 But perhaps reduced efficiency is precisely what we
want—at least in the realm of stockholder return-on-investment
efficiency. While neglected drug R&D provides relatively little
financial reward to an investor, if drug companies were somehow
incentivized to raise their R&D expenditures, then perhaps muchneeded (albeit unprofitable) drugs might become more available to
non-financial stakeholders such as patients and their families.
Ironically, this type of inefficiency could result in value for patients,
who are the ones really in need. And any measures drug companies
might take to reduce quality can be managed by the FDA.251
In conclusion, an MLR regulation could provide much-needed
value to the pharmaceutical industry in ways that the current
market structure fails to do. Ultimately, however, more thorough
analysis is needed to identify the optimal ratio and category
classification for each expense category. But in the current push to
expedite healthcare affordability and access, a pharmaceutical MLR
regulation could provide the much-needed guardrail to facilitate
maximum value for American healthcare consumers.
Cami R. Schiel*

it was revealed Europe accounted for 22.2 percent of all pharmaceutical sales of 2015, while
the US took 48.7 percent of the margin.”).
250. See Morton, supra note 33 (“[P]rice controls, in combination with government
requisitioning and corruption, created chaos in the French economy. Merchants responded
by reducing the quality of their goods and the black market blossomed, Bourne noted. ‘It
was the honest merchant who became the victim of the law.’”).
251. See Development & Approval Process (Drugs), supra note 226 (“American consumers
benefit from having access to the safest and most advanced pharmaceutical system in the
world. The main consumer watchdog in this system is FDA’s Center for Drug Evaluation
and Research (CDER). The center’s best-known job is to evaluate new drugs before they can
be sold. CDER’s evaluation not only prevents quackery, but also provides doctors and
patients the information they need to use medicines wisely. The center ensures that drugs,
both brand-name and generic, work correctly and that their health benefits outweigh their
known risks.”).
* J.D., December 2017, J. Reuben Clark Law School at Brigham Young University;
M.B.A., December 2017, Marriot School of Business, Brigham Young University; B.S. in
Nursing, April 2012, Brigham Young University. Schiel, a registered nurse, has worked at
Provo Rehabilitation and Nursing, the Utah State Hospital, and Utah Valley Hospital. She
thanks her family for the constant laughs and love, her professors for their patience and
encouragement, and expresses a huge thank-you to Brent for all of his help with this Note.
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